Two Essays on the Role of Uncertainty in Financial Markets by Stan, Raluca
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports 
2018 
Two Essays on the Role of Uncertainty in Financial Markets 
Raluca Stan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Stan, Raluca, "Two Essays on the Role of Uncertainty in Financial Markets" (2018). Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 7261. 
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/7261 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research 
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, 
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. 
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu. 
 
   
 






Dissertation submitted to the 
College of Business and Economics 
at West Virginia University 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Concentration in Finance 
 
 
Ann Marie Hibbert, Ph. D., Co-Chair 
Alex Kurov, Ph. D., Co-Chair 
Costanza Meneghetti, Ph. D. 
Bingxin Li, Ph. D. 
Feng Yao, Ph. D. 
 









Keywords: Monetary Policy; Macroeconomic Announcements; Financial Markets; Intraday Data; 
Ambiguity; Knightian Uncertainty; Earnings Announcements; Stock Returns; Market 
Efficiency; Systematic Risk.  
Copyright 2018 Raluca Stan
 
   
ABSTRACT 
Two Essays on the Role of Uncertainty in Financial Markets 
Raluca Stan 
This dissertation includes two essays investigating the role of uncertainty in financial markets. The 
first essay examines whether monetary policy uncertainty influences the reaction of the equity, 
Treasury security, foreign exchange and crude oil markets, as well as medium-term interest rates, 
to U.S macroeconomic announcements. The empirical results show that in the presence of higher 
policy uncertainty the response to macroeconomic news weakens in the stock and crude oil 
markets and strengthens in the Treasury, interest rate and foreign exchange markets. In times of 
elevated monetary policy uncertainty, macroeconomic announcements impact the financial and 
crude oil markets to a large extent through expectations of future monetary policy. 
The second essay investigates whether ambiguity is priced in the cross-section of stock 
returns. The results show that investors require a premium for being exposed to high levels of 
ambiguity, in addition to the premium they require for bearing risk. As ambiguity increases, small 
firms, firms that are unprofitable, non-dividend payers, firms that are riskier, and those with higher 
levels of earnings management, underperform relative to their counterparts. This essay also 
provides new evidence on how ambiguity affects the price discovery process in the stock market. 
In particular, during times of elevated ambiguity, firms with greater information asymmetry 
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This dissertation consists of two essays having as central theme the role of uncertainty in financial 
markets. The first essay entitled ‘Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Market Reaction to 
Macroeconomic News’ examines the impact of monetary policy uncertainty on the reaction of the 
equity, Treasury security, foreign exchange and crude oil markets, as well as medium-term interest 
rates, to U.S macroeconomic announcements. Economic news can impact the financial and 
commodity markets directly, through information about future economic conditions, and/or 
indirectly, through the expected reaction of monetary policy. This indirect effect is known in the 
literature as the ‘policy anticipation hypothesis’ (Cook and Korn, 1991). I posit that in times of 
high monetary policy uncertainty, macroeconomic indicators have a greater role in shaping 
investors’ expectations about future policy. This should have an impact on the markets’ response 
to macroeconomic announcements. By using intra-day futures data around the release time of 
macroeconomic indicators, the first essay provides evidence that higher monetary policy 
uncertainty weakens the reaction of the stock and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news, and 
strengthens the reaction of the bond and foreign exchange markets to such news. The findings 
indicate that during periods of elevated uncertainty about monetary policy, macroeconomic 
announcements impact the financial and crude oil markets to a large extent through expectations 
of future monetary policy. 
 The second essay entitled ‘Ambiguity and the Cross-section of Stock Returns’ investigates 
whether ambiguity is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Ambiguity is the other dimension 
of uncertainty, in addition to risk (Knight, 1921). While risk refers to uncertainty regarding future 
potential outcomes, ambiguity refers to uncertainty about the probabilities of future potential 
outcomes. There is a substantial amount of work on how systematic risk affects the cross-section 




of stock returns, but in contrast, less is known about the effect of ambiguity. This essay attempts 
to fill this gap. 
I construct a measure of systematic ambiguity based on the theoretical framework of 
expected utility with uncertain probabilities proposed by Izhakian (2017). The ambiguity measure 
is independent of attitudes towards ambiguity, risk, and attitudes towards risk. The results of the 
second essay indicate that investors require a premium for bearing ambiguity, in addition to the 
premium they require for bearing risk. I provide evidence that when ambiguity is expected to 
increase, stocks of firms with high information asymmetry and firms which are difficult to value 
and/or arbitrage, such as firms that are smaller, riskier, and less profitable, non-dividend payers, 
and firms with higher levels of earnings management, underperform relative to their counterparts.  
The second essay also examines the role of ambiguity in the relation between asset prices 
and firm-specific fundamentals. In particular, I examine how ambiguity affects the stock market 
reaction to earnings news. The results show that during ambiguous times, analysts tend to make 
less accurate forecasts, and so earnings surprises are larger in magnitude. This weakens the stock 
marginal response to earning news. In addition, I also provide evidence that ambiguity affects the 
stock market reaction to earnings news, beyond its impact on the magnitude of the earnings 
surprise. I attribute this finding to the impact of ambiguity on stock returns directly, via the rate 
used to discount future cash flows. This is motivated by the rational expectations equilibrium 
model of Veronesi (1999), according to which the discount rate can change with the level of 
uncertainty. 
  




Essay 1: Monetary Policy Uncertainty and the Market Reaction to Macroeconomic 
Announcements1 
 
‘Like tipsy drinkers, financial markets are seeing the world upside down. Bad economic 
news is good news if it means more central bank action to support growth. Good news 
that means central banks may withdraw the punchbowl is bad news.’  
The Financial Times, July 12, 2013 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Is monetary policy uncertainty important? According to the former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
(2003), ‘uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the 
defining characteristic of that landscape.’ Although Greenspan was referring to the uncertainty 
that policymakers face when they make decisions about monetary policy, the implementation of 
the policy itself can also generate uncertainty. In this context, clear communication of the central 
bank’s decisions and future intentions is important, particularly when the short-term interest rates 
are close to zero and conventional policy tools become ineffective.  
Irrespective of how clear and efficient the communication of the central bank is, there is 
always some uncertainty surrounding the future path of monetary policy. That is, it can be difficult 
for a central bank to commit to its plans because unexpected macroeconomic developments may 
call for a different policy stance. In this respect, forward guidance must be understood to be 
conditional on incoming economic data (Siklos, 2017). In the United States, the Federal Reserve 
links monetary policy to economic conditions, which brings substantial uncertainty to the markets 
(e.g., Wu, 2014).  
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether monetary policy uncertainty affects the 
reaction of the stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news. 
                                                          
1 This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Alexander Kurov. 




Economic news can impact the financial and commodity markets directly, through information 
about future economic conditions, and/or indirectly, through the expected reaction of monetary 
policy. This indirect effect is known in the literature as the ‘policy anticipation hypothesis’ (Cook 
and Korn, 1991). We posit that in times of high monetary policy uncertainty macroeconomic 
indicators have a greater role in shaping investors’ expectations about future policy. This should 
influence the response of the stock, bond, foreign exchange, and crude oil markets to 
macroeconomic news.  
Our sample covers the period from January 26, 2012 to December 15, 2015 and captures 
significant variation in the degree of uncertainty about future monetary policy. Our sample period 
begins immediately after January 25, 2012, the date when the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) started providing its members’ assessments of the appropriate level of the federal funds 
target rate in the next few years and in the longer term.2 The FOMC statement of September 13, 
2012 mentioned plans to keep the federal funds rate near zero ‘at least through mid-2015.’ These 
communications reduced monetary policy uncertainty in the first part of our sample. The second 
part of our sample is characterized by considerable uncertainty about the rate of reduction in the 
amount of monetary stimulus. Speaking before Congress on May 22, 2013, Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke stated that the Fed would start reducing asset purchases under the quantitative easing 
(QE) program if warranted by economic data. On June 19, 2013, Bernanke suggested that, if the 
economy continued to improve, the bond-buying program could end in 2014. In what later became 
known as the ‘taper tantrum,’ stock and bond prices fell on the news. Although the actual 
reductions in asset purchases did not start until December 2013, after May 2013 monetary policy 
uncertainty increased dramatically, since market participants interpreted incoming economic data 
                                                          
2 See for example Figure 2 in http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20120125.pdf  




in the light of their possible effect on the QE program and on the timing of the eventual increases 
of short-term interest rates.  
We consider 33 U.S. macroeconomic announcements and find that monetary policy 
uncertainty can significantly affect the response of different asset classes to macroeconomic news. 
In the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty, the reactions of the equity and crude oil 
futures markets to macroeconomic news weaken substantially, and the reactions of the Treasury 
and foreign exchange futures markets become much stronger. We also examine the effect of 
macroeconomic news on medium-term interest rates. The results are generally consistent with the 
results for Treasury securities, with monetary policy uncertainty having the biggest effect on the 
response to news of one- and two-year-ahead Eurodollar rates. Our results remain robust when 
controlling for other factors that could lead to time-varying response of these markets to news: 
changes in the macroeconomic conditions, changes in investor risk aversion, expected time until 
liftoff from the zero lower bound. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to research on 
the relation between asset prices and macroeconomic fundamentals by showing that monetary 
policy uncertainty is an important determinant of the response of different asset classes to 
macroeconomic news. Previous papers have argued that the response of financial markets to 
macroeconomic news depends on the state of the economy. For example, Blanchard (1981) and 
Orphanides (1992) argue that the same news can sometimes be good news and sometimes bad 
news for financial assets, depending on the state of the economy. Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) 
show that an announcement of rising unemployment is generally good news for stocks during 
economic expansions and bad news during economic contractions. An announcement of rising 
unemployment conveys information about lower interest rates (good news for stocks), and 




declining future corporate earnings (bad news for stocks). Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) show 
that information about interest rates prevails during economic expansions and information about 
future corporate cash flows dominates during recessions. Similarly, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold 
and Vega (2007) find that good economic news is bad (good) for stocks during economic 
expansions (recessions).  
We contribute to this literature by showing that the impact of economic news on a variety 
of markets can be affected by uncertainty about monetary policy. When monetary policy 
uncertainty is high, policy expectations become more sensitive to economic news, which affects 
the response of a variety of markets to such fundamental news. To our knowledge, we are the first 
to investigate whether monetary policy uncertainty affects the reaction of a variety of asset classes 
to macroeconomic announcements. Since our entire sample period is expansionary, our findings 
raise the possibility that the state dependence in the stock market response to economic news 
shown in prior studies has more to do with concerns about future monetary policy than with the 
stage of the business cycle.  
Our second contribution is to show that the zero lower bound can become less binding on 
medium-term interest rates well before the actual rate liftoff from the zero bound. This 
complements the results of Swanson and Williams (2014) who show that the zero lower bound 
reached in December 2008 became a binding constraint on medium-term interest rates (one- and 
two-year Treasury yields) only in late 2011. Such findings are useful because they show that if the 
zero lower bound is not simultaneously a binding constraint on intermediate-term yields, the Fed 
can still stimulate the economy by influencing expectations of future short-term interest rates 
through guidance about future policy.  




Finally, we show that uncertainty in central bank communication has important side 
effects. Absent clear statements from the Fed, market participants update their expectations of 
monetary policy based on incoming macroeconomic data. For instance, good news about the 
economy – such as stronger than expected GDP growth – increases the likelihood that the Fed will 
tighten monetary policy sooner rather than later. In times of high monetary policy uncertainty, 
macroeconomic announcements impact the financial and crude oil markets to a large extent 
through the expected reaction of monetary policy. This strengthens the reaction of the bond market 
and the U.S. dollar exchange rate to macroeconomic news and weakens the reaction of the stock 
and crude oil markets to such news. Therefore, our findings contribute to the literature on central 
bank communication with the financial markets.3  
1.2. Hypothesis 
Many theoretical models describe how information is impounded into asset prices in different 
economic environments. The intertemporal rational expectations equilibrium model of Veronesi 
(1999) shows that uncertainty about the state of the economy causes stock market investors to 
overreact to bad news in good economic times and underreact to good news in bad economic times. 
For example, when investors believe that the economy is in the good state and bad news arrives, 
investors become more uncertain about the state of the economy. The negative impact of the news 
on prices is strengthened by a rising discount rate generated by the increased investor uncertainty. 
The general equilibrium model of David and Veronesi (2013) predicts that implications of inflation 
news for future economic growth depend on the investors’ beliefs about the current inflation 
regime. This model explains the time-varying comovement of stocks and Treasury bonds. 
                                                          
3 For a survey of the literature on central bank communication, see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and 
Jansen (2008). 




Our paper investigates empirically how uncertainty about future monetary policy affects 
the reaction of the stock, bond, foreign exchange, and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news. 
Economic news can have direct and/or indirect effects on financial and commodity markets. The 
direct effect is driven by information about future economic conditions contained in a given 
announcement. The indirect effect of macroeconomic news on asset prices occurs through 
expectations about future monetary policy. For example, Cook and Korn (1991) explain that the 
interest rate reaction to employment news is affected by the impact of the news on the market 
expectations of future monetary policy actions. Economic news affects expectations of future 
monetary policy (Lapp and Pierce, 2012). These expectations can have a significant effect on asset 
prices (Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright, 2007). Table 1-1 summarizes the expected signs of direct 
and indirect effects of good and bad economic news for the four asset markets we examine.  
The Fed conditions monetary policy on incoming economic data. Good economic news 
increases the likelihood of QE tapering and accelerates the pace of policy firming, whereas bad 
news signals that the policy is likely to remain more accommodative. A reduction in Fed’s bond 
purchases increases long-term interest rates. It also advances the expected date of policy rate 
increases (e.g., Blinder, 2014; Wu, 2014), leading to an immediate increase in interest rates, 
particularly for intermediate maturities, and to a decrease in bond prices. Therefore, good (bad) 
economic news will have a negative (positive) indirect effect on returns of Treasury securities. The 
bond market should have a stronger reaction to macroeconomic news in the presence of high 
uncertainty about monetary policy because the news has a larger effect on market participants’ 
expectations regarding the future monetary policy, including the expected amounts of bond 
purchases and the timing of the possible changes in the target rate.  




 Macroeconomic announcements reveal three types of information relevant for valuing 
stocks: information about future interest rates, the equity risk premium, and future corporate 
earnings and dividends (Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan, 2005). Good news signals a healthy economy 
and has a direct positive effect on the stock market through the change in expectations of corporate 
earnings. It also has an indirect effect through the increase in interest rates and the equity premium 
due to the expected tightening reaction of monetary policy (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).4 In times 
of high policy uncertainty, economic news has a greater effect on expectations of future monetary 
policy. Thus, we expect a stronger sensitivity of interest rates and the risk premium to such news 
in the presence of high monetary policy uncertainty. Overall, due to the indirect effect, the response 
of stocks to economic news should weaken in times of high monetary policy uncertainty. 
Macroeconomic announcements can affect the value of the U.S. dollar as well. Good 
economic news increases the likelihood of tighter monetary policy, which could signal a possible 
decrease in the money supply and higher expected interest rates in the future, both having a positive 
(indirect) effect on the U.S. dollar. In this regard, Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) find 
evidence of such an indirect effect, showing that the response of the DEM/USD exchange rate to 
macroeconomic announcements appears to be driven by the likely reaction of the monetary 
authorities.5 Neely (2015) shows that unconventional monetary policy has a substantial effect on 
the value of the U.S. dollar at the zero lower bound. In times of high monetary policy uncertainty, 
macroeconomic announcements have a greater role in shaping expectations about the future path 
                                                          
4 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that the impact of monetary policy on equity prices is driven primarily by its effect 
on the risk premium. 
5 Economic news may also affect the exchange rates without mediation of monetary policy. However, as Almeida,   
Goodhart and Payne (1998) note, the direction of this effect is uncertain because it depends on the particular theoretical 
model used. 




of monetary policy. Thus, we would expect a stronger reaction of the U.S. dollar exchange rate to 
macroeconomic news in the presence of high monetary policy uncertainty.  
We also investigate whether the sensitivity of crude oil futures prices to macroeconomic 
news changes in the presence of high monetary policy uncertainty. Energy prices are driven by 
supply and demand, and supply and demand shocks for energy are often induced by changes in 
macroeconomic activity (Kilian, 2009). If energy futures prices respond to changes in expectations 
of economic activity, these prices should react positively to good economic news (direct effect). 
Good economic news also increases the likelihood of the Fed tightening its policy sooner rather 
than later. In this respect, Basistha and Kurov (2015) and Rosa (2014) show that oil prices decline 
in response to unexpected tightening of monetary policy.6 When future monetary policy is 
conditioned on incoming economic data and policy uncertainty is high, economic news exerts a 
larger influence on expectations of future policy. This is likely to produce an indirect effect on 
energy futures prices that counteracts the effect of information about demand for energy contained 
in macroeconomic news. Therefore, we expect a weaker reaction of the crude oil market to macro 
news in times of high monetary policy uncertainty. We test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: In the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty, the reactions of stocks 
and crude oil to macroeconomic news become weaker and the reactions of Treasury securities and 
the dollar exchange rate become stronger.  
 
                                                          
6 Barsky and Killian (2002, 2004) argue that monetary policy affects commodity prices through inflation expectations 
and economic growth. Frankel (2007) summarizes three channels through which monetary policy can affect 
commodity prices: (i) the inventory channel – low interest rates can increase the demand for commodities and reduce 
the opportunity cost of carrying inventories; (ii) the supply channel – low interest rates can decrease the supply for 
commodities and provide incentives not to extract the commodity today; and (iii) the financial channel – lower interest 
rates reduce the carrying cost of speculative positions, potentially leading to higher commodity prices. 





1.3.1. Macroeconomic Announcements 
We examine the market reaction to 33 scheduled U.S. macroeconomic announcements. In addition 
to 23 macroeconomic announcements examined in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003), we include ten other announcements that are frequently covered in the financial media: 
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Employment, Building Permits, Existing Home Sales, the 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Non-Manufacturing Index, Pending Home Sales, 
Preliminary and Final University of Michigan (UM) Consumer Sentiment Index, Empire State 
Manufacturing Survey, Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook and Chicago Purchasing Manager 
Index. A brief description of the macroeconomic announcements considered in our study is 
presented in Table 1-2. Similarly to Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), we group the 
indicators into seven categories: real activity, consumption, investment, government purchases, 
net exports, prices, and forward looking.  
In line with the theory of market efficiency, the market should only react to the 
unanticipated component of the macroeconomic news releases. Therefore, we focus on the 
announcement surprise, computed as the difference between the actual and the expected value of 
the economic statistic. Because different economic variables are measured in different units, we 
follow Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) and standardize the announcement surprises as follows: 
       𝑆𝑚𝑡 =
𝐴𝑚𝑡−𝐸𝑡−𝜏(𝐴𝑚𝑡)
?̂?𝑚
,                                (1) 
where 𝐴𝑚𝑡 is the announced value of indicator m, 𝐸𝑡−𝜏(𝐴𝑚𝑡) is the expected value of indicator m 
based on the Bloomberg median forecast, and ?̂?𝑚 is the sample standard deviation of 𝐴𝑚𝑡 −
𝐸𝑡−𝜏(𝐴𝑚𝑡). Standardizing the surprises allows comparing the market response to different 
announcements. 




1.3.2. Futures Returns 
We use five-minute futures data for the E-mini S&P 500, 10-year Treasury, the U.S. Dollar Index 
and WTI crude oil. We also use similar data for 5-year Treasury futures and for Eurodollar futures 
with 4-5, 8-9 and 12-13 quarters to expiration. The futures data are obtained from Genesis 
Financial Technologies. We use the nearby futures contracts for the S&P 500, Treasury, U.S. 
Dollar Index and crude oil. The nearby contract becomes relatively illiquid in its last few days of 
trading. Therefore, in the last three days of trading of the nearby contract we substitute prices of 
the next closest contract. Most of the U.S. macroeconomic announcements are made at 8:30 a.m. 
ET, when the stock market is closed but futures markets are open. Therefore, using futures market 
data allows examining the stock market reaction to macroeconomic news. For studying the impact 
of macroeconomic announcements on the foreign exchange market, we use the U.S. Dollar Index 
futures. This index is the world’s most widely recognized currency index, computed as a geometric 
average of six exchange rates (the Euro, the Japanese Yen, the British Pound, the Canadian Dollar, 
the Swedish Krona and the Swiss Franc) against the U.S. dollar. 
We use continuously compounded (i.e., log) returns from five minutes before to five 
minutes after a macroeconomic news release.7,8 Using a narrow intraday window around the 
announcement allows estimating market sensitivity to macroeconomic news more precisely than, 
for example, using daily data.  
 
                                                          
7 Existing studies (e.g., Ederington and Lee, 1995; Balduzzi, Elton and Green, 2001) show that the price adjustment 
to scheduled macroeconomic news is very rapid. 
8 As discussed in the Robustness Checks section, the results with wider event windows are very similar. 




1.3.3. Sample Selection and Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
Our sample period starts on January 26, 2012, the day after the FOMC started providing its 
members’ assessments of the appropriate level of the fed funds target rate for several years ahead 
and in the long run. This reduced monetary policy uncertainty, increased transparency, and 
improved the central bank communication with the financial markets. Our sample period ends on 
December 15, 2015, the day before the FOMC initiated liftoff from the zero lower bound. 
To examine how monetary policy uncertainty affects the market reaction to economic 
news, we need a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. Realized volatility of interest rate futures 
has been used in the literature as a measure of monetary policy uncertainty (Chang and Feunou, 
2014). Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2007) provide evidence that Eurodollar futures contracts 
reflect market expectations about future monetary policy. Kurov and Gu (2016) use the rates of 
Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to expiration to measure changes in expectations of monetary 
policy at the zero lower bound. Therefore, we use realized volatility of Eurodollar futures rates 
with 8-9 quarters to expiration to construct a measure of monetary policy uncertainty.  
Panel A of Figure 1-1 shows the daily realized volatility of the changes in the Eurodollar 
futures rate with 8-9 quarters to expiration, computed from five-minute futures prices. The realized 
volatility varies considerably across our sample period. A dramatic increase in volatility occurred 
on May 22, 2013, the day when the Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke testified in front of the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress that the Fed could begin reducing its bond purchases if 
economic data supported it. This increased the concerns about future monetary policy. The Bai-
Perron (2003) multiple breakpoint test identifies the presence of a structural break in realized 
volatility on May 28, 2013, a few days after Bernanke’s testimony.9  
                                                          
9 The Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test for one or more unknown structural breakpoints identifies a shift in the mean 
of the realized volatility on May 22, 2013, which coincides with the day of Bernanke’s testimony. 




Consistent with Wang and Yang (2009), we find that realized volatility is a long memory 
process, as indicated by its extremely slowly decaying autocorrelations. To account for this 
characteristic when constructing the monetary policy uncertainty proxy, we use the realized 
volatility model proposed by Corsi (2009). Specifically, we measure monetary policy uncertainty 
as the fitted values from the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility (HAR-RV) model 
shown in equation (2) below. This model includes past volatilities aggregated over different time 
horizons as explanatory variables. We denote 𝑟𝑣𝑡
𝐷 as the realized volatility on day t. The average 
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𝑄 , respectively. 
𝑟𝑣𝑡
𝐷 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑟𝑣𝑡−1
𝑘 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑄
𝑘=𝐷 ,                  (2) 
where 𝜉𝑡 is an error term; 𝜔 and 𝛽
𝑘 are parameters; and k = D (day), W (week), M (month), and Q 
(quarter).  
This model is motivated by the heterogeneity of market participants, which induces the 
dependence of current daily volatility on previous daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly 
volatilities. The combination of a small number of realized volatilities with different aggregation 
frequencies has been shown to provide a good approximation to long-memory dependencies found 
in the data (Corsi, 2009; Andersen, Bollerslev and Diebold, 2007; Wang and Yang, 2009). Using 
a volatility forecasting model to measure uncertainty is conceptually similar to the approach of 
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013), who use a forecast of realized variance to measure stock 
market uncertainty.  
Panel B of Figure 1-1 plots the monetary policy uncertainty variable. The uncertainty 
variable captures important events and policy changes in the US monetary policy. Ben Bernanke’s 




testimony of May 22, 2013 regarding the possibility of tapering the QE program brought 
significant uncertainty related to the start of the tapering process and to the timing of an eventual 
liftoff from the zero lower bound. Bernanke’s discussion on June 19, 2013 of the roadmap for the 
tapering process increased the uncertainty on that day. The FOMC statement of September 18, 
2013 about delaying the QE taper also increased uncertainty about the future policy. A higher than 
average level of uncertainty is also observed on December 18, 2013, the day when the tapering of 
the QE program started. Furthermore, statements of James Bullard, President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, made on October 16, 2014 regarding the possibility of extending the 
bond buying program increased monetary policy uncertainty. The FOMC decision on October 29, 
2014 to end the QE program temporarily decreased monetary policy uncertainty. However, the 
uncertainty increased later on, likely reflecting concerns about the timing of the liftoff from the 
zero lower bound. 
The two main factors influencing monetary policy uncertainty in our sample period are the 
timing of the beginning of the QE tapering and the timing of the first increase in the fed funds 
target rate. To test whether our proxy for monetary policy uncertainty captures uncertainty about 
these policy changes, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡,                   (3) 
where 𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 is a dummy variable with values of 1 from May 22, 2013 (Bernanke’s speech) until 
the actual start of the tapering process, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 captures 
the median anticipated number of quarters until the liftoff from the zero lower bound, according 
to the primary dealer surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.10 The results 
reported in Table 1-3 show that Bernanke’s tapering testimony increased monetary policy 
                                                          
10 The survey results are available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealer_survey_questions.html. 




uncertainty. The negative coefficient estimate of the liftoff variable indicates that monetary policy 
uncertainty increased as the expected rate liftoff drew closer. 
 
1.4. Empirical Results 
1.4.1. Baseline Results 
We begin by looking at the average effect of macroeconomic announcements on the returns in 
stock index, Treasury security, foreign exchange and crude oil markets. To isolate the impact of 
the macroeconomic news on the markets, our analysis centers on a tight intraday window 
surrounding the macroeconomic releases. We estimate the following regression: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝑡,                (4) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously compounded futures return from five minutes before to five minutes 
after a macroeconomic news release and 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise corresponding to 
announcement m. Only intervals containing at least one of the considered announcements are 
included in estimation. In intervals for which there is no surprise for a given announcement, we 
set the corresponding surprise to zero. Several announcements are often released at the same time. 
This model specification accounts for such simultaneous releases. We estimate the regression in 
(4) for all 33 announcements considered in our analysis, using the part of our sample period before 
May 22, 2013. This corresponds to a period of relatively low monetary policy uncertainty, as 
indicated by the Bai-Perron (2003) breakpoint test.  
The results are presented in Table 1-4. As expected, the estimated response coefficients for 
the stock and bond markets generally have opposite signs. For example, the estimated response 
coefficient for GDP news is positive for stocks and negative for bonds. Higher than expected GDP 
growth signals higher corporate earnings, which is good news for stocks. On the other hand, if the 




GDP growth exceeds expectations, the Fed is more likely to tighten monetary policy. As a 
consequence, yields increase and bond prices drop. The coefficient estimate for the GDP news is 
positive for crude oil and the U.S. Dollar Index futures. Better than expected output of the U.S. 
economy increases demand for energy, leading to higher oil prices. Since, as discussed above, 
good news about U.S. GDP leads to higher interest rates, the U.S. dollar appreciates in response.  
Similarly to GDP news, almost all announcements in the ‘real activity’ category aside from 
the unemployment rate and initial unemployment claims have a positive impact on the stock 
market, crude oil market and the dollar exchange rate and a negative impact on the bond market. 
Judging by the number of significant response estimates, the effect seems to be the strongest in the 
bond market, followed by the stock market and then by the crude oil and the foreign exchange 
markets. Only nonfarm employment, ADP employment and GDP releases have a statistically 
significant effect on all four markets. 
Next, most of the announcements categorized under the GDP components (consumption, 
investment, government purchases, and net exports) have positive effects on the stock and crude 
oil markets, and negative effects on the bond market. The most significant impacts of these releases 
are on the stock and crude oil markets. For example, news about durable goods orders has a 
positive and significant effect on the stock market, since the increase in durable goods purchases 
likely signals higher corporate profits. The impact of a jump in orders is also positive and 
significant for the crude oil market, but is negative for the bond market. Unsurprisingly, 
unexpected increases in the consumer price index have a significant negative effect on the returns 
of the Treasury note futures. 
Finally, most of the forward-looking macroeconomic indicators have a positive and 
significant effect on the equity market and a negative and significant effect on the bond market. 




For example, the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Manufacturing Survey is the first piece 
of news about the U.S. economy released every month. According to Baumohl (2013), ISM’s 
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) is the most influential statistic released by the private sector. If 
the economy is in an expansionary phase (and our sample period is expansionary), an increase in 
the PMI can signal rising inflationary pressures, leading to higher interest rates and hence negative 
bond returns. An increase in the PMI would also lead to a positive reaction from the equity and 
crude oil markets and to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar.  
Our significant results for the crude oil market are in contrast to the findings of Kilian and 
Vega (2011), who show that macroeconomic announcements have no significant effect on crude 
oil prices. For example, we find that Initial Unemployment Claims, Nonfarm Employment, 
Unemployment Rate, Personal Income, Consumer Credit, Durable Goods Orders, PPI, ISM’s 
Manufacturing PMI, and University of Michigan Confidence have a significant impact on crude 
oil futures price, whereas in the Kilian and Vega (2011) analysis these announcements do not move 
crude oil prices. This difference in results may be explained by our use of intraday data and by a 
more recent sample period used in our analysis.11 
Overall, out of the 33 announcements that we analyze, 20 have a statistically significant 
effect on the stock market and 22 significantly affect the Treasury security market. 15 of these 
announcements significantly influence the crude oil market, and only 10 significantly impact the 
U.S. dollar exchange rate. We estimate the regression in equation (4) simultaneously for all 
markets and perform a joint test for significance of the response coefficients for a given 
announcement. The p-values of this test are shown in the last column of Table 1-4. In the analysis 
                                                          
11 Chatrath, Miao, and Ramchander (2012) find a significant response of crude oil prices to several macroeconomic 
announcements during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Our results show that this responsiveness is not limited to 
the crisis period.  




that follows, we consider only the 22 macroeconomic announcements that have a significant effect 
on the markets (at the 10 percent significance level) based on the joint test. 
1.4.2. Effect of Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to Macroeconomic Announcements  
Next, we investigate whether monetary policy uncertainty affects the market reaction to 
macroeconomic news. In this part of the analysis, we focus on the 22 macroeconomic 
announcements for which the joint test mentioned above is significant at least at the 10 percent 
level. For each of these announcements, we estimate the following regression simultaneously for 
the E-mini S&P 500, 10-year Treasury note, the U.S. Dollar Index and the crude oil futures over 
the period from January 26, 2012 to December 15, 2015: 
      𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡,   (5) 
where 𝑅𝑡 and 𝑆𝑚𝑡 are defined above and 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 is the monetary policy uncertainty variable 
constructed as described in section 1.3.3. The 𝛾𝑚 coefficient captures the change in the market 
response to announcement m in the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 1-5. For the stock and the crude oil markets, 
almost all significant estimates of 𝛾𝑚 (except those for Empire Manufacturing for the stock market 
and Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook for the crude oil market) have an opposite sign compared 
to the estimated 𝛽𝑚 reported in Table 1-4. This indicates that the effect of macroeconomic news 
on stocks and the crude oil prices becomes weaker in times of higher monetary policy uncertainty. 
The change in the stock market response is statistically significant for nine announcements, and 
the change in the crude oil market response is significant for eight announcements. The results are 
generally consistent with our hypothesis that higher monetary policy uncertainty reduces the 
impact of macroeconomic announcements on equity and crude oil futures returns.  




The reaction of the Treasury security market to macroeconomic news grows stronger in the 
presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty. For the bond market, almost all of the significant 
estimates of 𝛾𝑚 (except that for the Unemployment rate) have the same sign as the corresponding 
estimates of 𝛽𝑚 reported in Table 1-4. It is noteworthy that the response of the Treasury market to 
both nonfarm employment and ADP employment announcements becomes significantly stronger 
in the presence of high monetary policy uncertainty. The Fed made the withdrawal of monetary 
stimulus conditional on continuing improvement in the labor market. Because news about the labor 
market affects the likelihood of QE tapering and the expected timing of rate increases, it has a 
stronger effect on the interest rates when the policy uncertainty is higher. Overall, the sensitivity 
of bond prices to eight out of 22 macroeconomic announcements used in the estimation 
significantly increases in the presence of higher policy uncertainty. The foreign exchange market 
behaves similarly to the bond market in terms of the change in its response to macroeconomic 
news in the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty. 10 of the 22 macroeconomic releases 
included in this analysis have a stronger impact on the foreign exchange market in the presence of 
higher monetary policy uncertainty.  
Table 1-5 also shows the p-values of the Wald test for the joint significance of the 𝛾 
coefficients for a given market (with the null hypothesis of no significant 𝛾𝑚, 𝑚 = 1, 22̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). The p-
values are extremely low, indicating that sensitivity of all four markets to macroeconomic news is 
significantly affected by increased policy uncertainty. Overall, the results are supportive of our 
hypothesis regarding change in the market reaction to macroeconomic news in the presence of 
higher monetary policy uncertainty.  
Uncertainty about monetary policy can be expected to influence the response of interest 
rates to macroeconomic news. We have seen that higher policy uncertainty is associated with a 




stronger reaction of long-term interest rates. Do medium-term interest rates react in a similar way? 
We use Eurodollar futures with 4-5, 8-9, and 12-13 quarters to expiration and the 5-year Treasury 
note futures and estimate the regression in equation (5). The only difference here is that the 
dependent variable is the change in Eurodollar futures rates (expressed in basis points) or the 
change in the yield of 5-year Treasuries.12 
The regression results reported in Table 1-6 provide evidence of a stronger reaction of the 
medium-term yields to macroeconomic news in times of higher monetary policy uncertainty. 
Almost all of the 𝛾𝑚 estimates for the Eurodollar futures rates with 12 quarters to maturity are 
significant for the same announcements that have a significant effect on the 10-year Treasury 
futures market, although the coefficient signs are opposite because here we use rate changes rather 
than returns. Overall, these results are consistent with our results for the Treasury futures market 
shown in Table 1-5. The low p-values of the joint test of 𝛾𝑚 estimates show that the sensitivity of 
all four rate maturities to macroeconomic news is significantly affected by monetary policy 
uncertainty.  
1.4.3. Time-Varying Response to Macroeconomic News 
Next, we examine the time-varying sensitivity of the stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil 
markets to macroeconomic news. One way of doing this would be to run the regression in equation 
(4) over rolling windows. However, this approach suffers from small-sample problems because 
most of the macroeconomic announcements that we consider are released monthly and even a one-
year rolling window would include only 12 releases of a given type. To overcome this problem, 
we follow the procedure proposed by Swanson and Williams (2014). The procedure assumes that 
                                                          
12 The 5-year Treasury yield changes are computed by dividing the intraday return on the 5-year Treasury futures by 
the duration of the underlying bond.  




the relative magnitudes of the response coefficients in equation (4) are constant over time, and 
only the overall magnitude of these coefficients varies. This assumption allows us to ‘pool’ the 
surprises for all announcements in a single estimation. 
We begin by running the regression in equation (4) simultaneously for all markets for the 
period before May 22, 2013 and saving the estimated coefficients ?̂?𝑚.
13 We then use these 
estimates to compute normalized announcement surprises as ?̂?𝑚𝑡 = ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡 for the 22 significant 
macroeconomic announcements. Sometimes several of these announcements occur at the same 
time. Since we want to collapse all announcement surprises into a single variable, we sum up the 
normalized surprises for announcements that occurred at the same time. We then generalize the 
regression in (4) to the following specification: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑆𝑆?̂? + 𝑢𝑡,                                                    (6) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously compounded futures return from five minutes before to five minutes 
after a macroeconomic news release and 𝑆?̂?𝑡 = ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1  is the sum of the normalized surprises 
for announcements that occurred in that interval. This specification reduces the small-sample 
problem in the rolling regression because we no longer need to estimate a separate response 
coefficient for each announcement type. Due to the transformation of announcement surprises 
discussed above, the b coefficient in equation (6) has an average value of unity from the beginning 
of the sample period to May 22, 2013. Changes in the b estimate after May 22, 2013 show whether 
the market reaction to news changed in a period of increased monetary policy uncertainty.  
We estimate the regression in (6) using a rolling window that includes 128 observations, 
roughly corresponding to a six-month period. We then plot the estimated coefficients b for the 
                                                          
13 The period preceding Bernanke’s tapering testimony is characterized by relatively low monetary policy 
uncertainty, as indicated by the Bai-Perron (2003) multiple breakpoint test. 




stock, bond, foreign exchange, and crude oil markets in Figure 1-2. The time-varying responses of 
the stock and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news seem to be similar. In particular, the 
estimated b coefficients for both the stock and crude oil market show a marked decline after May 
22, 2013. The weaker response of the stock and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news 
following May 2013 supports our hypothesis and is consistent with our previous findings. The 
responses of the bond and foreign exchange markets also follow a similar pattern across time. For 
these two markets, the estimated coefficient b increases during the period characterized by greater 
monetary policy uncertainty that begins after May 22, 2013. Hence, consistent with the regression 
results in Table 1-5, the bond and the foreign exchange markets generally react stronger to 
macroeconomic news in the presence of higher policy uncertainty.  
It is noteworthy that the strongest reaction of the bond and foreign exchange markets to 
macroeconomic news occurred between September and December 2013, and between October and 
November 2015. During these periods, the reaction of the stock and crude oil markets to 
macroeconomic news was the weakest. Monetary policy uncertainty was elevated during these 
periods. Uncertainty increased in September 2013, when the Fed surprised the markets by delaying 
the beginning of QE tapering until December 2013. Similarly, monetary policy uncertainty 
increased in October 2015 after the Fed surprised the markets by leaving the interest rates 
unchanged until December of the same year.  
Figure 1-3 plots the estimated b coefficients for the Eurodollar futures rates and the 5-year 
Treasury yield. All four panels illustrate a similar pattern to the one found in Figure 1-2 for the 
bond market. That is, the estimated coefficient b increases relative to the period of low monetary 
policy uncertainty (i.e., before May 22, 2013). This suggests a stronger reaction of the medium-
term interest rates to macroeconomic news in the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty.    




To conduct a statistical test of the influence of monetary policy uncertainty on the market 
response to news, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆?̂? + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑆?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡.            (7) 
The coefficient 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 captures the impact of greater monetary policy uncertainty on the 
market response to the normalized surprises. 
Panel A of Table 1-7 shows that the average responses of the stock and crude oil markets 
to macroeconomic news decrease significantly in the presence of higher monetary policy 
uncertainty. The responses of the bond and the foreign exchange markets to macroeconomic news 
strengthen in times of higher monetary policy uncertainty. Similarly, the responses of the one-, 
two-, and three-year-ahead Eurodollar rates, and the five-year Treasury yield to macroeconomic 
news also strengthen significantly in the presence of higher monetary policy uncertainty. The 
responses of the one- and two-year-ahead Eurodollar rates strengthen the most. This finding is 
consistent with the changes in the two-year rate being a good indicator of changes in expectations 
of future monetary policy (e.g., Hanson and Stein, 2015). Our results indicate that in times of 
higher monetary policy uncertainty expectations of future policy become more sensitive to 
macroeconomic news. Overall, the estimates in Table 1-7 confirm that the effect of monetary 
policy uncertainty on the market reaction to macroeconomic news is economically important for a 
variety of asset classes.  
Previous literature shows that other factors could lead to time-varying response of markets 
to macroeconomic news. One of these factors may be investors’ degree of risk aversion.14 Risk 
aversion seems to be closely related to monetary policy: lax monetary policy decreases risk 
aversion (Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013; Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018), while tight 
                                                          
14 For example, the model of Veronesi (1999) decomposes the stock price sensitivity to news into an uncertainty 
component and a risk-aversion component stemming from the investors’ degree of risk aversion. 




policy increases risk aversion (Inekwe, 2016).15 Furthermore, Husted, Rogers, and Sun (2016) 
argue that time-varying risk aversion could potentially contaminate measures of monetary policy 
uncertainty. Therefore, we need to control for changes in investor risk aversion. We follow 
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) and construct a proxy for risk aversion by decomposing 
the VIX into a risk aversion component and expected stock market volatility.16 Our monetary 
policy uncertainty measure is positively and significantly correlated with the VIX (with correlation 
coefficient of 0.08) and with the risk aversion component (with correlation coefficient of 0.09). 
We re-run the regression in equation (7) while controlling for the VIX and the VIX components, 
and report our results in Panels B and C of Table 1-7. Our results remain robust when controlling 
for the VIX or for the VIX components. Monetary policy uncertainty weakens the reaction of the 
stock and crude oil markets to macroeconomic news, and strengthens the reaction of the bond and 
the foreign exchange markets to such fundamental news. In addition, risk aversion seems to 
strengthen the response of the stock and the crude oil markets to macroeconomic announcements.  
Another potential concern about our results is that our regression models do not account 
for business cycle variation. Although our entire sample period is expansionary, the real business 
conditions change over time. To control for changing real business conditions, we use the daily 
Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business conditions index, introduced by Aruoba, Diebold and 
Scotti (2009). This index is based on in real-time values of several economic indicators, including 
initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less 
transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP. Positive values of the 
index indicate better-than-average economic conditions, and negative values indicate worse-than-
                                                          
15 In contrast, Nave and Ruiz (2015) find that a lax monetary policy increases the short-run risk aversion if one 
accounts for the simultaneity between domestic monetary policy and the stock market behavior.   
16 For details of this decomposition of the VIX, see Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). 




average conditions. We run the regression in (7) with an additional interaction term between 𝑆𝑆?̂? 
and the (lagged) ADS index, and report the results in Panel A of Table 1-8. The effect of monetary 
policy uncertainty on the response of stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil markets to 
macroeconomic news remains significant after controlling for changes in the real business 
conditions. The estimated coefficient of the additional interaction term is significant for the bond 
and the foreign exchange markets only.  
An additional potential concern is that our results may be influenced by the market 
expectations regarding the timing of the liftoff from the zero lower bound. We estimate the 
regression in equation (7) with an additional interaction term between 𝑆𝑆?̂? and the median expected 
number of quarters until the first target rate increase, based on the primary dealer surveys. The 
results in Panel B of Table 1-8 are consistent with our previous findings. Monetary policy 
uncertainty weakens the reaction of the stock and the crude oil markets to macroeconomic news, 
and strengthens the reaction of the bond market to such news. These results may be affected by 
multicollinearity, since the expected time until liftoff is strongly correlated with monetary policy 
uncertainty (as seen in Table 1-3). However, the estimated coefficients of the policy uncertainty 
interaction term are significant at the 1% significance level for three of the four markets. For the 
foreign exchange market, the shorter the expected time until liftoff (and therefore the greater the 
corresponding policy uncertainty), the stronger the market reaction to macroeconomic news. 
On December 12, 2012, the FOMC statements omitted the ‘mid-2015’ forward guidance 
and started including specific targets for the unemployment rate that would have to be met for the 
Fed to consider raising the target rate. One can argue that the reaction of markets to 
macroeconomic announcements can potentially be affected by this ‘data driven’ monetary policy. 
To account for the effect of the data driven policy, we run the regression in (7) with an additional 




interaction term between 𝑆𝑆?̂? and a data driven policy dummy, taking values of 1 after December 
12, 2012, for the periods when unemployment rate is above the 6.5% threshold mentioned in the 
FOMC statements, and 0 otherwise. The results, reported in Panel C of Table 1-8, are generally 
consistent with our previous findings. In addition, the data driven monetary policy seems to 
strengthen the reaction of the bond and foreign exchange markets to macroeconomic news.  
In order to test that our results are not driven by the economic uncertainty in general, but 
rather by the uncertainty about monetary policy, we estimate the regression in equation (7) with 
an additional interaction term between 𝑆?̂?𝑡 and the economic policy uncertainty index constructed 
by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The estimates reported in Panel D of Table 1-8 suggest that 
our main results remain robust after controlling for the economic policy uncertainty.  
We also investigate whether our main results still hold when controlling for the VIX or for 
the VIX components, in addition to the other controls used in Table 1-8 regressions. The results 
are reported in Tables A-1 and A-2 in the Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the MPU 
interaction term are similar to those in Table 1-8. 
1.4.4. Robustness Checks 
It is possible that other economic news may affect the results of the event study regressions. Using 
a narrow intraday window around the announcement helps to exclude most such events. As a 
robustness check, we re-estimate our regressions using wider event windows, (-10 minutes, +10 
minutes) and (-15 minutes, 15 minutes) around each macroeconomic release.17 The results are very 
similar to those reported in Tables 1-4, 1-5 and 1-6. The results are also similar when the 
                                                          
17 We include a longer pre-announcement interval in the event window to capture the pre-announcement price drift 
found by Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser and Wolfe (2016) for several U.S. macroeconomic announcements.  




regressions are estimated for different event windows starting five minutes before the 
announcement. 
We investigate whether our main results remain robust when using an alternative proxy for 
monetary policy uncertainty. For this purpose, we measure uncertainty as a moving average of the 
daily realized volatility of Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to expiration. We compute the 
moving average of the realized volatility over the last 21 trading days, excluding the current day. 
Using the moving average of realized volatility as a proxy for uncertainty reduces the noise in the 
realized volatility. We re-estimate the regression in equation (7) using this proxy for uncertainty, 
while also controlling for VIX or VIX components. The results summarized in Table A-9 in the 
Appendix indicate that our findings remain qualitatively similar.  
A possible concern with this proxy for monetary policy uncertainty is that the length of the 
window used for the moving average is selected arbitrarily. To address this issue, we considered 
reasonable variation in the length of the window used for computing the moving average of 
realized volatility. Untabulated results indicate that our findings remain robust when monetary 
policy uncertainty is measured as the moving average of the daily realized volatility over the last 
42, 10 and five trading days. 
Additional robustness checks, including a test for asymmetry in the market reaction to good 
and bad macroeconomic news, a test of autocorrelation in the announcement surprises, and a test 
of nonlinearity in the market response to news, can be found in the Appendix.18 Overall, the 
robustness checks support the conclusion that the responses of the bond and foreign exchange 
markets to macroeconomic news strengthen in the presence of high monetary policy uncertainty, 
and the responses of stock and crude oil markets become weaker.  
                                                          
18 Other robustness checks are also discussed in the Appendix. 





This study investigates whether monetary policy uncertainty affects the reaction of the stock, bond, 
foreign exchange and crude oil markets to macroeconomic announcements. We find that 
uncertainty about future monetary policy weakens the reaction of the equity and crude oil markets 
to macroeconomic news and strengthens the reactions of the medium- and long-term interest rates 
and of the U.S. dollar exchange rate to such fundamental news.  
Understanding the role of monetary policy uncertainty in the relation between asset prices 
and macroeconomic surprises is important for traders. It helps them anticipate the market reaction 
to the news if they attempt to forecast the announcement surprises (Kurov, Sancetta, Strasser and 
Wolfe, 2016) or execute high-frequency trading strategies after the announcement (Scholtus, van 
Dijk, and Frijns, 2014). Our results suggest that the responses of stock and bond prices to economic 
developments in period of stable policy expectations may be quite different from those in times of 
high monetary policy uncertainty. This finding may be useful to investors using tactical asset 
allocation techniques. 
Beechey and Wright (2009) show that news about real activity affects the term structure of 
interest rates primarily by moving expectations of future real short-term rates. Our results suggest 
that expectations of future rates become particularly sensitive to economic news and therefore less 
stable in periods of high monetary policy uncertainty. This instability of rate expectations should 
have an effect on consumption and investment decisions and therefore on the overall economic 
activity. This is important for central banks because it highlights the key role of clear 
communications for implementing effective monetary policy. Understanding how monetary policy 
uncertainty affects market reaction to macroeconomic news should also be useful to central banks 
planning exit from unconventional monetary policy programs. 




We also contribute to the literature on how markets process information. Many studies 
show that it is difficult to explain price variation with fundamental news.19 Based on the existing 
literature, only the state of the economy should matter for the market response to macroeconomic 
news. In contrast, we show that uncertainty about monetary policy also influences the effect of 
economic news on asset prices. Our findings also raise the possibility that the business cycle 
variation in the stock market reaction to economic news documented in prior studies has more to 
do with monetary policy expectations than with the state of the economy. We leave examination 
of this issue to future research.  
                                                          
19 See, for example, Roll (1988), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), and 
Boudoukh, Richardson, Shen, and Whitelaw (2007). 




Table 1-1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Macroeconomic News on the Stock, Bond, Foreign 
Exchange, and Crude Oil Markets 
This table shows the expected signs of the effects of good and bad macroeconomic news on asset returns. 
    U.S. Stocks Crude Oil 
U.S. Treasury 
Security 
U.S. Dollar  
Good News 
Direct Effect 
(News about Economy) 
+ + n/a n/a 
Indirect Effect 
(Due to reaction of 
monetary policy) 
− − − + 
Bad News 
Direct Effect 
(News about Economy) 
− − n/a n/a 
Indirect Effect 
(Due to reaction of 
monetary policy) 
+ + + − 
  




Table 1-2: U.S. Macroeconomic Announcements 
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Employment and Training Administration (ETA), Automatic Data Processing, 
Inc. (ADP) and Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC (MALLC), Bureau of the Census (BC), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 
National Association of Realtors (NAR), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of Treasury (USDT), 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), Conference Board (CB), Institute for Supply Management (ISM), 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRBP), Thomson Reuters and University of Michigan (TRUM), National 
Association of Purchasing Management (NAPM). 
2 The total number of observations in the sample 
3 U.S. Eastern Time 
The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. 
Announcement Source1 Obs.2 Frequency Announcement Time3 
Real Activity     
GDP advance final preliminary BEA 47 Monthly 8:30 AM 
Initial unemployment claims ETA 203 weekly 8:30 AM 
Nonfarm employment BLS 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Unemployment Rate BLS 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
ADP employment ADP/MALLC 47 monthly 8:15 AM 
Advance retail sales BC 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Existing home sales NAR 46 monthly 10:00 AM 
Industrial production FRB 46 monthly 9:15 AM 
Capacity utilization FRB 46 monthly 9:15 AM 
Personal income BEA 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Consumer Credit FRB 47 monthly 3:00 PM 
Consumption     
New home sales BC 46 monthly 10:00 AM 
Personal Spending BEA 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Investment     
Durable goods orders BC 48 monthly 8:30 AM 
Construction spending BC 46 monthly 10:00 AM 
Factory orders BC 46 monthly 10:00 AM 
Wholesale inventories BC 47 monthly 10:00 AM 
Government Purchases     
Government budget USDT 47 monthly 2:00 PM 
Net Exports     
Trade balance BEA 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Prices     
Consumer price index BLS 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Producer price index BLS 47 monthly 8:30 AM 
Forward Looking     
ISM Manufacturing  ISM 47 monthly 10:00 AM 
ISM Non-manufacturing  ISM 47 monthly 10:00 AM 
Consumer confidence CB 47 monthly 10:00 AM 
U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim TRUM 47 monthly 9:55 AM 
U. of Michigan Conf-Final TRUM 47 monthly 9:55 AM 
Housing starts BC 44 monthly 8:30 AM 
Pending home sales NAR 46 Monthly 10:00 AM 
Building permits BC 45 Monthly 8:30 AM 
Empire Manufacturing FRBNY 47 Monthly 8:30 AM 
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook FRBP 46 Monthly 10:00 AM 
Chicago Purchasing Manager Index NAPM 47 Monthly 9:45 AM 
Index of leading indicators CB 47 Monthly 10:00 AM 
  




Table 1-3: Time Variation in Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
This table reports the estimated coefficients for the following model: 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡 +
𝛾2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡, where 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 is the monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as described in section 
1.3.3, 𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡  is the tapering dummy variable with values of 1 from May 22, 2013 until December 17, 2013, the day 
before the QE taper started, and 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 is the median expected number of quarters until the liftoff from the 
zero lower bound based on the primary dealer surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The 
sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. 
 
  Coefficient p-value 
𝐷𝑇𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡  0.172*** <.0001 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 -0.034*** <.0001 






Table 1-4: Response of Stock, Bond, Foreign Exchange and Crude Oil Futures to Macroeconomic News 
in a Period of Low Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
The table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
33
𝑚=1 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously compounded return of 
the S&P 500 futures, 10-year Treasury note futures, the U.S. Dollar Index futures or WTI crude oil futures. 𝑅𝑡 is from five minutes 
before to five minutes after a macroeconomic announcement. 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for the announcement of type m. The last 
column of the table shows the p-values corresponding to the Wald joint test of significance with the null hypothesis that the given 
announcement has no significant effect on any of the four markets. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 05/22/2013. The regressions 
are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 










Real Activity      
GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.052* -0.036***  0.029*  0.059* 0.001 
Initial Unemployment Claims -0.072***  0.043*** -0.009 -0.097*** <0.0001 
Nonfarm Employment  0.360*** -0.216***  0.129***  0.382*** <0.0001 
Unemployment rate -0.104***  0.070* -0.019 -0.150*** 0.001 
ADP Employment  0.080*** -0.051***  0.041***  0.031* <0.0001 
Advance Retail Sales  0.092*** -0.068***  0.050***  0.046 <0.0001 
Existing Home Sales  0.115*** -0.027*** -0.039**  0.045 <0.0001 
Industrial Production -0.013 -0.006 -0.007  0.076 0.535 
Capacity Utilization  0.017 -0.012  0.026* -0.059 0.305 
Personal Income  0.032*** -0.013***  0.005  0.036*** <0.0001 
Consumer Credit  0.016* -0.002 -0.007  0.037** 0.109 
Consumption      
New Home Sales  0.175*** -0.028*** 0.036  0.185*** <0.0001 
Personal Spending  0.007  0.003 -0.003  0.013 0.923 
Investment      
Durable Goods Orders  0.068*** -0.028* -0.013  0.114*** <0.0001 
Construction Spending -0.005 -0.005  0.005 -0.028 0.853 
Factory Orders  0.033 -0.011 -0.002  0.072 0.351 
Wholesale Inventories  0.003  0.003 -0.017  0.051 0.318 
Government Purchases      
Government Budget -0.020* -0.007  0.014***  0.000 0.027 
Net Exports      
Trade Balance -0.004  0.005  0.018  0.005 0.838 
Prices      
Consumer Price Index  0.005 -0.019** -0.012  0.032 0.144 
Producer Price Index  0.035*** -0.008  0.009  0.073** 0.002 
Forward Looking      
ISM Manufacturing  0.291*** -0.098***  0.020  0.182*** <0.0001 
ISM Non-manufacturing  0.081** -0.029***  0.041***  0.034 <0.0001 
Consumer Confidence  0.040 -0.022***  0.001  0.044 0.012 
U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.092*** -0.041*** -0.002  0.113*** <0.0001 
U. of Michigan Conf-Final  0.030 -0.019**  0.011  0.065 0.047 
Housing Starts  0.052*** -0.042***  0.040***  0.014 <0.0001 
Pending Home Sales  0.097*** -0.029*** -0.003  0.093*** <0.0001 
Building Permits  0.014 -0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.599 
Empire Manufacturing  0.014 -0.023**  0.044*** -0.014 0.001 
Philadelphia Fed business Outlook  0.100*** -0.022*  0.036  0.156* 0.003 
Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.198*** -0.043*** -0.008  0.233*** <0.0001 
Index of Leading Indicators  0.023 -0.016*  0.009 -0.013 0.343 
Nr. Obs.   408  408  408  408   





Table 1-5: Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to Macroeconomic News 
The table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡 ,  where 𝑅𝑡 is the 
continuously compounded return of the S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, the U.S. Dollar Index futures, or the WTI 
crude oil futures. 𝑅𝑡 is from five minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic announcement. 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise 
for announcement m, while 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡  is the monetary policy uncertainty variable, computed as described in section 1.3.3. The table also 
shows the p-values of the Wald joint significance test with the null hypothesis of no significant 𝛾𝑚 (m=1,22)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for each given market. 
The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 S&P 500 10-Year T-note US Dollar Index Crude Oil 
Announcement 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 
Real Activity         
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.049  0.023  0.027 -0.129* -0.024  0.144** -0.044  0.091 
   Initial Unemployment Claims -0.100***  0.089***  0.066*** -0.040  0.001 -0.030 -0.167***  0.177*** 
   Nonfarm Employment  0.823*** -0.830**  0.315** -0.814*** -0.501**  0.978***  1.344*** -1.582*** 
   Unemployment rate -0.340**  0.427**  0.457*** -0.591*** -0.286**  0.388** -0.424**  0.492* 
   ADP Employment  0.169*** -0.172***  0.081* -0.224*** -0.147***  0.304***  0.402** -0.599** 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.063  0.039  0.034 -0.174*** -0.090*  0.227*** -0.019  0.098 
   Existing Home Sales  0.177* -0.160 -0.050**  0.030 -0.107**  0.141***  0.409*** -0.533*** 
   Personal Income  0.013  0.001 -0.089  0.126  0.097* -0.147* -0.054  0.126 
Consumption 
  
      
   New Home Sales  0.051 -0.014  0.008 -0.050 -0.005  0.045  0.119 -0.124 
Investment 
  
      
   Durable Goods Orders -0.023  0.072  0.193*** -0.291*** -0.288***  0.384***  0.606** -0.758* 
Government Purchases 
  
      
   Government Budget -0.127***  0.162***  0.016 -0.029  0.037 -0.041 -0.007  0.021 
Prices 
  
      
   Producer Price Index  0.107*** -0.111***  0.007 -0.042 -0.025  0.066*  0.039 -0.012 
Forward Looking 
  
      
   ISM Manufacturing  0.361** -0.280 -0.109**  0.022 -0.054  0.144*  0.312** -0.254 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.083 -0.050  0.015 -0.079*** -0.001  0.089  0.160 -0.206 
   Consumer Confidence  0.098 -0.033  0.000 -0.036 -0.019  0.061  0.157 -0.162 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.149** -0.113 -0.048**  0.025 -0.026  0.040  0.137 -0.110 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final  0.171 -0.223  0.031 -0.066 -0.009  0.025  0.457* -0.590* 
   Housing Starts  0.194*** -0.214***  0.018 -0.080  0.030  0.022  0.053 -0.072 
   Pending Home Sales  0.237*** -0.262*** -0.016 -0.002 -0.047*  0.071**  0.142 -0.176 
   Empire Manufacturing -0.133  0.217*  0.036 -0.095  0.001  0.053 -0.188  0.280 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  0.112 -0.086  0.035 -0.085***  0.070 -0.042 -0.185  0.391* 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.194 -0.161 -0.052  0.008 -0.007  0.053  0.297 -0.328 
p-value of Wald Test   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 ¤   <.0001 
Nr. Obs.    985    985    985    985 






Table 1-6: Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Response of Medium-term Interest Rates to 
Macroeconomic News 
The table reports estimates for the following model: ∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡 ,   where 
∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 represents the change in the interest rate (Eurodollar rate or Treasury yield) from five minutes before to five minutes after 
a macroeconomic announcement. The rate and yield changes are in basis points. 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise for announcement 
m, while 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡  is the monetary policy uncertainty variable, computed as described in section 1.3.3. The table also shows the p-
values of the Wald joint significance test with the null hypothesis of no significant 𝛾𝑚 (m=1,22)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for the given market. The sample 
period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 
Eurodollar 4-5 
Quarters to Expiration 
Eurodollar 8-9 






Announcement 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 𝛽 ϒ 
Real Activity            
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)  -0.374  1.388*  0.267  1.562  0.111  2.131 -0.291  1.841* 
   Initial Unemployment Claims -0.221  0.018 -0.328 -0.204 -0.884*  0.255 -0.714**  0.313 
   Nonfarm Employment -9.869***  16.284*** -12.279***  22.686*** -9.644***  20.964*** -9.001***  17.533*** 
   Unemployment rate -2.271  2.607 -4.797**  6.029* -7.139**  9.005** -5.505***  7.065*** 
   ADP Employment -1.559***  2.971*** -2.752***  5.583*** -2.342**  5.561*** -1.964***  4.204*** 
   Advance Retail Sales -2.521***  4.250*** -2.787***  5.456*** -1.652**  4.563*** -1.445***  3.713*** 
   Existing Home Sales  0.132 -0.043  0.641 -0.422  1.051* -0.727  0.528** -0.302 
   Personal Income  1.396** -1.995**  2.045*** -3.016**  2.216* -3.262*  1.766** -2.585** 
Consumption            
   New Home Sales -0.856  1.326*  0.343  0.330  0.161  0.596 -0.350  1.048 
Investment            
   Durable Goods Orders -1.876***  2.799*** -3.974***  5.753*** -4.476***  6.684*** -3.177***  4.700*** 
Government Purchases            
   Government Budget -0.316  0.449 -0.620  0.899 -0.478  0.739 -0.110  0.304 
Prices            
   Producer Price Index  0.276  0.059  0.133  0.466  0.376  0.338 -0.127  0.741 
Forward Looking            
   ISM Manufacturing -0.227  0.862  0.311  1.050  1.327  0.505  0.876  0.378 
   ISM Non-manufacturing -0.256  0.867* -0.697  1.800*** -0.674  1.990*** -0.355  1.355*** 
   Consumer Confidence  0.122  0.171 -0.298  0.998 -0.204  1.109 -0.228  0.748 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.153  0.078  0.151  0.342  0.550* -0.180  0.455* -0.155 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final -0.589  0.866 -0.736  1.362* -0.806  1.616** -0.450  0.982* 
   Housing Starts -0.540  1.057 -0.943  2.160 -0.783  2.170 -0.523  1.430 
   Pending Home Sales -0.051  0.219  0.217  0.115  0.553** -0.121 -0.023  0.273 
   Empire Manufacturing -1.346*  2.180** -1.797  3.109* -1.571  2.898 -1.028  2.042* 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook -0.217  0.609* -0.805**  1.637*** -1.011*  2.082*** -0.750**  1.497*** 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager -0.249  0.726** -0.130  0.984**  1.603** -0.773  0.104  0.629 
p-value of Wald Test   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
Nr. Obs.    986   986   986   986 






Table 1-7: Average Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to Macroeconomic News 
Panel A reports the estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡 is 
the continuously compounded return of the S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, the U.S. Dollar Index futures, the WTI crude 
oil futures, or the change in the Eurodollar rate of the stated contract maturity or the change in the 5-year Treasury yield. The returns and rate 
changes are computed from five minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic news release. 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for 
announcement m. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡  is the monetary policy uncertainty variable, computed as explained in section 3.3. ?̂?𝑚 estimates are obtained from 
running the regression in equation (4) using the part of the sample before May 22, 2013. Panel B reports the estimates of the following model: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the 
CBOE's Volatility Index measuring the market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Panel C 
reports the estimates of the model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑈𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22





𝑚=1 𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝑐𝑈𝐶 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑈𝐶𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑅𝐴𝑡 and 𝑈𝐶𝑡 are the risk aversion and the uncertainty components of the VIX index 
and are constructed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013).  For all panels, only the announcements that are 
significant according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The 
regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Basic Regression 𝑏𝑆 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝑐𝑅𝐴 𝑐𝑈𝐶  𝑅
2 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=985) 
   S&P 500  1.561*** -1.375*** - - - 20.97% 
   10-year Treasury note   0.297  1.242*** - - - 47.89% 
   U.S. Dollar Index -0.514  2.680*** - - - 27.73% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.895*** -1.975*** - - - 6.39%    
  
  




   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -2.086*  5.974*** - - - 22.34% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -1.509***  4.440*** - - - 45.82% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.474  2.528*** - - - 52.27% 
   5-year Treasury note -0.762*  3.097*** - - - 48.82% 
Panel B: Controlling for the VIX        
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=984) 
   S&P 500  0.261 -1.402***  0.300*** - - 27.89% 
   10-year Treasury note   0.484  1.242*** -0.042 - - 48.00% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  0.321  2.702*** -0.194 - - 28.15% 
   WTI Crude Oil  0.825* -1.934***  0.236*** - - 8.26%    
   
 
Medium-term interest rates (N=984) 
  
   
 
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -0.846  6.057*** -0.304 - - 22.46% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.579  4.457*** -0.215 - - 45.85% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  0.182  2.494*** -0.146* - - 51.76% 
   5-year Treasury note -0.018  3.113*** -0.173* - - 48.56% 
Panel C: Controlling for the VIX components 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960) 
   S&P 500  0.809* -1.370*** -  0.026***  0.051 25.51% 
   10-year Treasury note   2.116***  1.292*** -  0.006 -0.227*** 48.17% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  1.486  2.511*** - -0.006 -0.203* 29.51% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.687** -1.905*** -  0.025*** -0.017 7.82%    
 
   
Medium-term interest rates (N=960) 
  
 
   
    Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  3.083  6.338*** -  0.008 -0.655** 23.17% 
    Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  1.952*  4.655*** -  0.003 -0.431*** 46.92% 
    Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  1.662**  2.599*** - -0.001 -0.258*** 52.03% 





Table 1-8: Average Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to Macroeconomic News 
 (with controls) 
The table reports the estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈  𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22





𝑚=1 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡. 𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑚𝑡, and ?̂?𝑚 are defined in the paper. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 is the monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as explained in section 
3.3. 𝑋𝑡 is a control variable, that accounts for the (lagged) Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index in Panel A, the median anticipated number 
of quarters until the liftoff from the ZLB (based on primary dealer survey by the FRBNY) in Panel B, the data driven monetary policy dummy (with 
values of 1 when unemployment rate was above 60.5% after 12/12/2012, and 0 otherwise) in Panel C, and the Baker-Bloom-Davis economic policy 
uncertainty index (divided by 100) in Panel D. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
         Panel A: Controlling for the State of the Economy  
𝑏𝑆 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑐𝑋 R
2 




   S&P 500  1.595*** -1.448*** -0.251 21.44% 
10-year Treasury note   0.369  1.113*** -0.404*** 48.44% 
U.S. Dollar Index -0.349  2.275*** -1.360*** 29.43% 
WTI Crude Oil  1.936*** -2.045*** -0.168 6.48% 




Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -1.972  5.706*** -0.927 22.56% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -1.454***  4.330*** -0.370 46.02% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.457  2.495*** -0.121 52.36% 
5-year Treasury note -0.703  2.976*** -0.414 49.16% 
         Panel B: Controlling for Market Expectations of the Liftoff from the Zero Lower Bound 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=983) 
 
      
   S&P 500  0.897** -0.867**  0.042* 22.46% 
10-year Treasury note   0.121  1.404**  0.009 48.16% 
U.S. Dollar Index  1.761  0.658 -0.116* 28.60% 
WTI Crude Oil  0.589 -0.935**  0.079*** 8.10% 




Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  7.208** -1.719 -0.523*** 27.48% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  0.499  2.785*** -0.114** 46.60% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.657  2.688***  0.009 51.66% 
5-year Treasury note  0.469  2.069** -0.069 48.93% 
         Panel C: Controlling for Data Driven Monetary Policy 




S&P 500  1.633*** -1.399*** -0.137 21.43% 
10-year Treasury note   0.092  1.355***  0.341*** 48.64% 
U.S. Dollar Index -0.951  3.005***  0.545** 28.36% 
WTI Crude Oil  1.929*** -1.992*** -0.057 6.46% 




Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -1.135  5.420*** -1.371** 23.53% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -1.550**  4.463***  0.061 45.84% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.725**  2.676***  0.383*** 52.98% 
5-year Treasury note -0.873*  3.161***  0.172 48.93% 
          Panel D: Controlling for Economic Policy Uncertainty 




S&P 500  0.989*** -0.982***  0.003*** 22.65% 
10-year Treasury note    0.839**  0.834* -0.002** 48.25% 
U.S. Dollar Index  0.575  1.824* -0.004* 28.18% 
WTI Crude Oil  1.209*** -1.505***  0.003*** 7.47% 




Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  0.511  4.256** -0.013*** 23.60% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.243  3.487*** -0.006*** 46.53% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  0.225  1.998*** -0.003** 52.71% 





Figure 1-1. Volatility of Eurodollar Futures with 8-9 Quarters to Expiration and Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
Panel A shows the daily realized volatility of Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to expiration. The annualized realized 
volatility is computed using five-minute price changes. Panel B shows the monetary policy uncertainty variable computed 
as explained in section 3.3. 
Panel A: Daily Realized Volatility (%) 
 





Figure 1-2. Response of Stock, Bond, Foreign Exchange and Crude Oil Markets to Macroeconomic News 
The time-varying response coefficient is estimated using a rolling OLS regression with a window of 128 observations (approximately 6 months). Grey lines are one-standard-error bands. 
E-mini S&P 500 futures 10-year Treasury note futures 
  






Figure 1-3. Response of Medium-term Interest Rates to Macroeconomic News 
The time-varying response coefficient is estimated using a rolling OLS regression with a window of 128 observations (approximately 6 months). Grey lines are 
one-standard-error bands. 
Eurodollar futures with 4-5 quarters to expiration Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to expiration 
  


















Appendix A: Essay 1 - Additional Robustness Checks 
I. Asymmetry in the Response of Markets to Macroeconomic Announcements  
Previous literature has shown that asset prices tend to respond asymmetrically to good and bad 
economic news (e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003; Hautsch and Hess, 2001; 
Beber and Brandt, 2010), and more strongly to larger news (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and 
Vega, 2003; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). If such asymmetry is present in our sample, one could 
argue that the results might not be driven by the high monetary policy uncertainty itself, but rather 
by a string of negative surprises in a period of high uncertainty, or by a string of larger surprises. 
To address this concern, we first examine whether the markets respond asymmetrically to positive 
and negative macroeconomic news, by estimating the following regression: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
+ 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
− 𝑆𝑚𝑡
−22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡,    (A1) 
where 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0), 𝑆𝑚𝑡
− = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0), and 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for the 
announcement type m. 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously compounded futures return from five minutes before 
to five minutes after a macroeconomic news release. We test the null hypothesis 𝑎𝑚
+ = 𝑎𝑚
−  for each 
individual macroeconomic announcement. The results reported in Tables A-3 and A-4 indicate 
that, in general, the markets do not respond asymmetrically to positive and negative news. As an 
additional robustness check, we re-run the model in equation (A1) for periods of low and high 
monetary policy uncertainty, namely for periods when uncertainty is in the first and the last quintile 
over our sample period. Untabulated results indicate that in general the markets do not respond 
asymmetrically to positive and negative news when monetary policy uncertainty is low or high.  
To investigate whether our results are driven by a string of negative surprises in the 





macroeconomic surprises by estimating the following two regressions for each announcement 
type:  
  𝑆𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑡,      (A2) 
𝑆𝑚𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑆𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑆𝑚𝑡−1𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡.    (A3) 
The periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 represent the announcement dates, while 𝑀𝑃𝑈 denotes the 
monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as explained in section 3.3. The results reported in 
Table A-5 show that, in general, there is no significant autocorrelation in these macroeconomic 
surprises. Therefore, it is not very likely that our results are driven by a string of negative surprises 
during times of monetary policy uncertainty.  
If our results were driven by a string of larger macroeconomic surprises, we would expect 
to see a nonlinear relationship between the returns and the macroeconomic surprises. A possible 
way of testing for such nonlinearity is by running the following regression:  





𝑚=1 + 𝑡.   (A4) 
The results reported in Table A-6 show that the estimates of 𝑎2𝑚 are usually insignificant 
at the 10% significance level. Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by a string of large 
surprises during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty. As an additional robustness check, 
we find that, in general, the absolute values of the macroeconomic surprises are not larger in the 
presence of high monetary policy uncertainty. This additional result is reported in Table A-7. 
One could also argue that our results may reflect changes in investors’ disagreement, as 
mentioned by Pericoli and Veronese (2015). To address this concern, we proxy investor 
disagreement by the standard deviation of analyst forecasts for each macroeconomic statistic and 
run a simple OLS regression of the standard deviation of analyst forecasts on the monetary policy 





of analyst forecasts in not significantly higher in the presence of higher monetary policy 
uncertainty. This indicates that our results probably do not reflect changes in investor 
disagreement.  
II. Alternative Proxy for Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the results from Table 1-7 with an alternative proxy of 
monetary policy uncertainty. For this purpose, we measure uncertainty as a moving average of the 
daily realized volatility of Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to expiration. We compute the 
moving average of the realized volatility over the last 21 trading days, excluding the current day. 
Using the moving average of realized volatility as a proxy for uncertainty reduces the noise in the 
realized volatility. Figure A-1 plots the pattern followed over time by this alternative proxy of 
uncertainty. 
The results reported in Table A-9 are qualitatively similar to our previous findings. That 
is, the reactions of the stock and crude oil markets to macroeconomic announcements weaken, 
while the reactions of the bond and the foreign exchange markets to such announcements 
strengthen in times of high monetary policy uncertainty. The results are also robust when 
controlling for the VIX or the VIX components. 
A possible concern with this proxy for monetary policy uncertainty is that the length of the 
window used for the moving average is selected arbitrarily. To address this issue, we considered 
reasonable variation in the length of the window used for computing the moving average of 
realized volatility. We compute the moving average of the daily realized volatility over the last 42, 





III. Weighted Least Squares 
Intraday asset returns that we use in our regressions are heteroskedastic due to volatility clustering, 
intraday periodicity of volatility, and possibly different effect of different announcement types on 
volatility. We use event study regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. This 
increases the coefficient standard errors relative to a model that captures heteroskedasticity of 
returns. It should, therefore, make it more difficult for us to find significant results. However, our 
regression results are strongly statistically significant, suggesting that our results are quite strong. 
To improve estimation efficiency, we perform a robustness check that uses a weighted least 
squares (WLS) estimation procedure similar to the one used by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and 
Vega (2007). We first estimate the following equation (equation (7) in the paper), with OLS: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆?̂? + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑆𝑆?̂?𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡,   (A5) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the return or rate change computed from five minutes before to five minutes after a 
macroeconomic news release and the other variables are defined in the paper. We then use the 
residuals of this equation to estimate the following volatility model: 
ln(?̂?𝑡
2) = 𝛽 ln(?̂?𝑡−1
2 ) + ∑ 𝛾𝑑𝐷𝑑
𝑁
𝑑=1 + 𝛿1|𝑆?̂?𝑡| + 𝛿2𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿3|𝑆?̂?𝑡|𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡.    (A6) 
The dummy variables 𝐷𝑑 capture systematic differences in volatility across different times of the 
day. 𝑁 = 6, based on the number of different times of the day (8:15 a.m., 8:30 a.m., 9:45 a.m., 
9:55 a.m., 10:00 a.m., and 2:00 p.m.) when market-moving macro announcements are released. 
The first lag of volatility is included in the model to capture the possible volatility clustering. After 
estimating equation (A6), we use the estimated volatility 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑙𝑛(?̂?𝑡
2) − 𝜖?̂?) in the WLS estimation 
of equation (A5). The results are provided in Table A-10. As expected, the coefficient standard 
errors are smaller than the White (1980) standard errors. The conclusions, however, remain 





news weakens in the stock and crude oil markets and becomes stronger in the Treasury, interest 






Table A-1: Average Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to 
Macroeconomic News (Controlling for the VIX and other variables) 





𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑐𝑋 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡. 𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑚𝑡, and ?̂?𝑚 are defined in the paper. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡  is the 
monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as explained in section 3.3. 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the CBOE's Volatility Index measuring the market 
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. 𝑋𝑡  is a control variable, that accounts for the 
(lagged) Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index in Panel A, the median anticipated number of quarters until the liftoff from 
the ZLB (based on primary dealer survey by the FRBNY) in Panel B, the data driven monetary policy dummy (with values of 1 when 
unemployment rate was above 6.5% after 12/12/2012, and 0 otherwise) in Panel C, and the Baker-Bloom-Davis economic policy 
uncertainty index (divided by 100) in Panel D. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using 
OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Controlling for the State of the Economy 𝑏𝑆 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝑐𝑋 R
2 




   S&P 500  0.301 -1.446***  0.296*** -0.146 28.06% 
10-year Treasury note   0.612  1.105*** -0.054 -0.424*** 48.58% 
U.S. Dollar Index  0.639  2.284*** -0.228* -1.431*** 30.04% 
WTI Crude Oil  0.853** -1.964***  0.233*** -0.069 8.28% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=982)      
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -0.642  5.787*** -0.326 -0.983 22.71% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.458  4.324*** -0.228 -0.446 46.10% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  0.225  2.447*** -0.150* -0.162 51.87% 
5-year Treasury note  0.092  2.980*** -0.184* -0.461** 48.95% 
Panel B: Controlling for Market Expectations of the Liftoff from the Zero Lower Bound 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=984) 
S&P 500 -0.100 -1.072***  0.284***  0.028 28.53% 
10-year Treasury note   0.268  1.432** -0.040  0.010 48.27% 
U.S. Dollar Index  2.411*  0.757 -0.172 -0.111 28.95% 
WTI Crude Oil -0.118 -1.045**  0.196***  0.068*** 9.48% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=984)      
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  7.260*** -1.628 -0.037 -0.518*** 27.52% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  1.070  2.908*** -0.167 -0.105* 46.87% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.166  2.801*** -0.145*  0.017 52.13% 
5-year Treasury note  0.945  2.201** -0.143 -0.061 49.27% 
Panel C: Controlling for Data Driven Monetary Policy 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=984) 
S&P 500  0.318 -1.415***  0.296*** -0.069 28.02% 
10-year Treasury note   0.142  1.352*** -0.009  0.333*** 48.69% 
U.S. Dollar Index -0.292  2.970*** -0.137  0.457* 28.57% 
WTI Crude Oil  0.804* -1.929***  0.238***  0.026 8.26% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=984)      
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  0.803  5.476*** -0.446 -1.514*** 23.87% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.524  4.439*** -0.221 -0.052 45.86% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.206  2.619*** -0.107  0.338** 52.28% 
5-year Treasury note -0.123  3.144*** -0.163  0.093 48.59% 
Panel D: Controlling for Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=984) 
S&P 500  0.150 -1.272***  0.283***  0.001 28.19% 
10-year Treasury note    0.830*  0.824*  0.006 -0.002* 48.31% 
U.S. Dollar Index  0.867  2.084** -0.140 -0.003 28.38% 
WTI Crude Oil  0.618 -1.663***  0.193**  0.002* 8.76% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=984)      
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  0.700  4.373*** -0.079 -0.012** 23.51% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  0.034  3.695*** -0.122 -0.004* 46.23% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  0.449  2.162*** -0.106 -0.002 51.92% 





Table A-2: Average Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to 
Macroeconomic News (Controlling for the VIX components and other variables) 





𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑐𝑅𝐴 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝑐𝑈𝐶 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑈𝐶𝑡 + 𝑐𝑋 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡. 𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑚𝑡, and ?̂?𝑚 are defined in the paper. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 is 
the monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as explained in section 3.3. 𝑅𝐴𝑡 and 𝑈𝐶𝑡 are the risk aversion and the uncertainty components of the 
VIX index and are constructed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). 𝑋𝑡 is a control variable, that accounts for the (lagged) 
Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index in Panel A, the median anticipated number of quarters until the liftoff from the ZLB (based on primary 
dealer survey by the FRBNY) in Panel B, the data driven monetary policy dummy (with values of 1 when unemployment rate was above 6.5% after 
12/12/2012, and 0 otherwise)  in Panel C, and the Baker-Bloom-Davis economic policy uncertainty index (divided by 100) in Panel D. The sample period 
is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 Panel A: Controlling for the State of the Economy 𝑏𝑆 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑐𝑅𝐴 𝑐𝑈𝐶 𝑐𝑋 𝑅
2 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960) 
   S&P 500  0.789* -1.430***  0.024***  0.057 -0.276* 26.02% 
   10-year Treasury note   2.049***  1.214***  0.004 -0.214*** -0.382** 48.51% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  1.579*  2.312*** -0.011 -0.212** -1.311*** 30.84% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.696** -1.937***  0.024*** -0.015 -0.080 7.85% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=960) 
      
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  2.968  6.211***  0.004 -0.634* -0.635 23.27% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  1.927*  4.613***  0.002 -0.426*** -0.240 46.98% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  1.647**  2.599*** -0.001 -0.256*** -0.049 52.05% 
   5-year Treasury note  1.953**  3.119*** -0.001 -0.323*** -0.267 49.78% 
Panel B: Controlling for Market Expectations of the Liftoff from the Zero Lower Bound 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960) 
      
   S&P 500  0.216 -1.035**  0.023***  0.071  0.030 26.35% 
   10-year Treasury note   1.947*  1.420**  0.006 -0.224***  0.007 48.39% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  4.078**  0.510 -0.003 -0.248** -0.118* 30.36% 
   WTI Crude Oil  0.310 -1.037**  0.020***  0.022  0.070*** 9.11% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=960) 
      
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  14.544*** -1.563  0.041 -0.917*** -0.555*** 28.82% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  4.238**  3.011***  0.009 -0.474*** -0.116** 48.10% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  1.340  2.850*** -0.001 -0.253***  0.014 52.38% 
   5-year Treasury note  3.307**  2.185***  0.004 -0.351*** -0.067 50.42% 
Panel C: Controlling for Data Driven Monetary Policy  
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960)             
   S&P 500  0.863* -1.378***  0.026***  0.047 -0.040 25.59% 
   10-year Treasury note   1.786**  1.414***  0.008 -0.215***  0.300** 48.71% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  1.110  2.754*** -0.002 -0.202*  0.357 29.76% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.651* -1.897***  0.025*** -0.015  0.031 7.83% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=960) 
      
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  5.109*  5.628*** -0.003 -0.734** -1.705*** 24.91% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  2.108*  4.594***  0.002 -0.436*** -0.143 46.97% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  1.348  2.747***  0.002 -0.253**  0.318** 52.47% 
   5-year Treasury note  1.980**  3.164***  0.001 -0.330***  0.015 49.67% 
Panel D: Controlling for Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960)             
   S&P 500  0.614 -1.221***  0.024***  0.051  0.001 25.91% 
   10-year Treasury note    2.475***  0.955**  0.009 -0.221*** -0.002 48.40% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  1.968  2.070** -0.003 -0.198* -0.002 29.64% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.307 -1.631***  0.020*** -0.014  0.002** 8.34% 
Medium-term interest rates (N=960) 
      
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  5.105*  4.727***  0.026 -0.630** -0.012** 24.19% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  2.661**  3.999***  0.010 -0.420*** -0.004* 47.22% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  1.914**  2.348***  0.001 -0.252*** -0.001 52.14% 





Table A-3: Test for Asymmetry in the Response of Markets to Macroeconomic Announcements 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
+ 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
− 𝑆𝑚𝑡
−22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously compounded return for the S&P 500 futures, the 
WTI crude oil futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, and the U.S. Dollar Index futures. The returns are computed from five minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic 
news release. 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for the announcement of type m, and 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0) and 𝑆𝑚𝑡
− = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0). The table also reports the difference in the markets’ 
responses to positive vs. negative news of each macroeconomic announcement. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Only the announcements that are significant according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. 



















            
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.083**  0.054***  0.029  0.053  0.038  0.015 -0.086*** -0.064*** -0.022  0.122***  0.065***  0.057** 
   Initial Unemployment Claims -0.034*** -0.023* -0.011 -0.032* -0.008 -0.024  0.024***  0.046*** -0.022* -0.014** -0.038***  0.024* 
   Nonfarm Employment  0.007  0.389*** -0.382** -0.046  0.337*** -0.384** -0.350*** -0.295*** -0.055  0.315***  0.192***  0.124 
   Unemployment rate  0.195** -0.151***  0.346***  0.087 -0.194***  0.280* -0.027 -0.006 -0.022  0.087  0.039  0.048 
   ADP Employment  0.037**  0.067*** -0.031  0.006 -0.097  0.103 -0.071*** -0.093***  0.023  0.050***  0.108*** -0.058* 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.155***  0.077**  0.078**  0.112***  0.047  0.065 -0.095*** -0.126***  0.031  0.067***  0.117*** -0.049* 
   Existing Home Sales  0.023  0.048* -0.025 -0.025 -0.068  0.043 -0.025** -0.021*** -0.004  0.008  0.023 -0.016 
   Personal Income  0.010  0.036 -0.026  0.015  0.072 -0.057 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003  0.001 -0.011  0.012 
Consumption 
            
   New Home Sales  0.057***  0.025  0.032  0.097 -0.046  0.143** -0.030*** -0.036***  0.006  0.020  0.040*** -0.020 
Investment 
            
   Durable Goods Orders  0.001  0.084*** -0.083**  0.016 -0.006  0.022 -0.008 -0.075**  0.067* -0.014  0.058* -0.072** 
Government Purchases 
            
   Government Budget  0.004 -0.013  0.017  0.008  0.013 -0.005 -0.006 -0.013  0.007  0.003  0.011 -0.008 
Prices 
            
   Producer Price Index  0.000  0.016 -0.016 -0.016  0.052** -0.067 -0.041*** -0.021** -0.020  0.029*  0.030*** -0.002 
Forward Looking 
            
   ISM Manufacturing  0.098**  0.169*** -0.071  0.095**  0.120*** -0.025 -0.085*** -0.097***  0.012  0.056***  0.065*** -0.009 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.000  0.139*** -0.139*** -0.027  0.030 -0.057 -0.049*** -0.058***  0.008  0.063***  0.099*** -0.037* 
   Consumer Confidence  0.052***  0.090*** -0.038  0.015  0.026 -0.011 -0.039*** -0.021*** -0.017  0.036***  0.031*  0.004 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.071**  0.050***  0.021  0.011  0.066 -0.054 -0.042*** -0.018*** -0.024  0.007  0.007  0.000 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final  0.025 -0.053  0.078**  0.053 -0.084  0.137 -0.036***  0.008 -0.044***  0.009  0.014 -0.005 
   Housing Starts  0.044**  0.000  0.044 -0.025  0.013 -0.038 -0.070*** -0.036 -0.033  0.071***  0.031*  0.040 
   Pending Home Sales  0.033 -0.001  0.034 -0.041  0.010 -0.051 -0.027** -0.010* -0.017  0.007  0.018*** -0.011 
   Empire Manufacturing  0.048**  0.051** -0.003  0.086***  0.030  0.056 -0.069*** -0.030** -0.039  0.035*  0.048*** -0.013 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  0.007  0.063* -0.056  0.107**  0.148** -0.041 -0.055*** -0.023** -0.032**  0.051***  0.033*  0.018 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.019  0.090** -0.070 -0.004  0.032 -0.036 -0.045*** -0.046***  0.001  0.035***  0.039*** -0.004 













Table A-4: Test for Asymmetry in the Response of Medium-term Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: ∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
+ 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+22
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑚
− 𝑆𝑚𝑡
−22
𝑚=1 + 𝑡, where ∆𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 measures the change in the interest rate (Eurodollar rate or Treasury 
yield) from five minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic announcement. The rate and yield changes are in basis points. 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for the announcement m, 
and 𝑆𝑚𝑡
+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0) and 𝑆𝑚𝑡
− = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆𝑚𝑡, 0). The table also reports the difference in the markets’ responses to positive vs. negative news of each macroeconomic announcement. The 
sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Only the announcements that are 
significant according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively.  
 
Eurodollar 4-5 Quarters to 
Expiration 
Eurodollar 8-9 Quarters to 
Expiration 
Eurodollar 12-13 Quarters to 
Expiration 


















Real Activity                  
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.831**  0.639***  0.192  1.646***  1.296***  0.349  1.972***  1.573***  0.399  1.281***  1.036***  0.245 
   Initial Unemployment Claims -0.131** -0.305***  0.175 -0.359*** -0.691***  0.332* -0.492*** -0.936***  0.444* -0.312*** -0.665***  0.353** 
   Nonfarm Employment  3.506***  2.072*  1.434  6.320***  4.511***  1.809  7.273***  6.335***  0.938  5.232***  4.229***  1.003 
   Unemployment rate -0.257  0.361 -0.618 -0.021  0.588 -0.609  0.003  0.203 -0.199  0.357  0.306  0.051 
   ADP Employment  0.445***  0.769*** -0.324  1.050***  1.563*** -0.513  1.503***  1.822*** -0.319  0.879***  1.338*** -0.459 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.311*  1.492*** -1.181***  1.048***  2.312*** -1.264***  1.642***  2.588*** -0.946**  1.113***  2.034*** -0.921*** 
   Existing Home Sales  0.084  0.089 -0.005  0.271  0.262**  0.009  0.436*  0.352***  0.085  0.312**  0.206**  0.106 
   Personal Income -0.067  0.135 -0.203 -0.034 -0.046  0.012  0.031 -0.129  0.160 -0.010 -0.024  0.015 
Consumption 
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   New Home Sales  0.214  0.312*** -0.097  0.555***  0.629*** -0.074  0.617***  0.652*** -0.036  0.510***  0.526*** -0.015 
Investment 
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   Durable Goods Orders  0.081  0.668** -0.588*  0.020  1.368** -1.348*  0.239  1.587** -1.348*  0.131  1.076** -0.945 
Government Purchases 
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   Government Budget  0.038  0.049 -0.011  0.121  0.031  0.090  0.159  0.023  0.136  0.116  0.200 -0.085 
Prices 
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   Producer Price Index  0.432**  0.149  0.283  0.749***  0.293  0.456  0.955***  0.410**  0.545*  0.689***  0.343**  0.346 
Forward Looking 
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   ISM Manufacturing  0.425***  0.497*** -0.072  1.092***  1.205*** -0.113  1.758***  1.708***  0.050  1.079***  1.264*** -0.185 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.512***  0.353*  0.159  0.783***  0.905*** -0.121  0.984***  1.065*** -0.081  0.777***  0.813*** -0.036 
   Consumer Confidence  0.256**  0.289** -0.033  0.706***  0.341***  0.364  0.923***  0.492***  0.431  0.541***  0.234**  0.307 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.274*  0.180**  0.095  0.576***  0.340***  0.236  0.503**  0.318**  0.185  0.521***  0.203**  0.319 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final  0.262*** -0.284***  0.546***  0.556*** -0.153  0.710***  0.695*** -0.028  0.723***  0.491*** -0.027  0.518*** 
   Housing Starts  0.678***  0.099  0.579**  1.176***  0.618*  0.558  1.429***  0.757  0.671  0.977***  0.475  0.502 
   Pending Home Sales  0.182*  0.104  0.078  0.410**  0.243***  0.167  0.511***  0.385***  0.126  0.326*  0.124*  0.202 
   Empire Manufacturing  0.657**  0.387*  0.271  1.311***  0.567  0.744  1.387***  0.583  0.804  1.129***  0.456*  0.673 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  0.499***  0.162  0.338**  0.957***  0.288**  0.669***  1.278***  0.322*  0.957***  0.872***  0.234  0.639*** 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.211***  0.524*** -0.313***  0.487***  0.927*** -0.440**  1.033***  0.839***  0.194  0.580***  0.695*** -0.115 
Nr. Obs.   986 
 
   986 
 
   986 
 
   986 
  





Table A-5: Test of Autocorrelation in Macroeconomic Surprises 
The second column of this table reports estimation results for the following regression: 𝑆𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise for the announcement m. The periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 refer to the announcement 
dates. The third and fourth columns report the estimation results for the following regression: 𝑆𝑚𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑆𝑚𝑡−1 +
𝑏2𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑆𝑚𝑡−1𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡. MPU denotes the monetary policy uncertainty variable computed as explained in 
section 3.3. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Only the announcements that are significant according to the 
joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent respectively. 
Announcement 
Without Accounting for 
MPU 
Accounting for MPU 
𝑎1 𝑏1 𝑏3 
Real Activity 
   
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)                    0.113 -0.368  0.579 
   Initial Unemployment Claims                   0.075 -0.361  0.519* 
   Nonfarm Employment                  -0.058 -0.178  0.149 
   Unemployment rate                   0.005 -0.144  0.153 
   ADP Employment                   0.167  0.973 -1.237 
   Advance Retail Sales                  -0.009 -1.023**  1.154* 
   Existing Home Sales                  -0.192 -0.665  0.523 




















   ISM Manufacturing                   0.038  0.328 -0.378 
   ISM Non-manufacturing                  -0.122  1.160 -1.527 
   Consumer Confidence                  -0.372** -0.666  0.340 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim                  -0.037 -0.020 -0.031 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final                   0.278**  0.938* -0.982 
   Housing Starts                  -0.274 -0.118 -0.234 
   Pending Home Sales                  -0.169 -1.024  1.133 
   Empire Manufacturing                  -0.138 -0.135 -0.004 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook                   0.054  0.177 -0.168 






Table A-6: Accounting for Nonlinearity in the Market Response to Macroeconomic Announcements 
This table reports estimation results for the following regression:𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎1𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝑎2𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡




𝑚=1 , where 𝑅𝑡 is the continuously 
compounded return for the E-mini S&P 500 futures, the WTI crude oil futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, or the U.S. Dollar Index futures. 𝑅𝑡 is from five 
minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic announcement. 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise for the announcement m. The sample period is from 
01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. 
  S&P 500 Crude Oil 10-Year T-note US Dollar Index 





      
  
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.072***  0.005  0.050  0.004 -0.077*** -0.003  0.100***  0.008** 
   Initial Unemployment Claims -0.028***  0.000 -0.018 -0.001  0.040*** -0.002*** -0.030***  0.001** 
   Nonfarm Employment  0.188*** -0.036  0.131** -0.042 -0.328*** -0.013  0.264***  0.015 
   Unemployment rate -0.039  0.008 -0.085  0.010 -0.069 -0.015**  0.060  0.006 
   ADP Employment  0.045***  0.000 -0.072  0.019* -0.091***  0.006**  0.091*** -0.009** 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.119***  0.009  0.060** -0.003 -0.109***  0.003  0.087*** -0.007** 
   Existing Home Sales  0.036  0.002 -0.046  0.011 -0.025*** -0.002*  0.015 -0.004 





      
  





      
  





      
  





      
  





      
  
   ISM Manufacturing  0.130*** -0.005  0.109***  0.001 -0.089***  0.002  0.062***  0.000 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.084*** -0.020***  0.023 -0.016*** -0.055***  0.002  0.082*** -0.005 
   Consumer Confidence  0.071*** -0.003  0.026  0.004 -0.031*** -0.003  0.033*** -0.001 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  0.058***  0.002  0.040 -0.007 -0.029*** -0.002  0.005 -0.002 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final -0.014  0.021** -0.012  0.028 -0.016** -0.006  0.011 -0.001 
   Housing Starts  0.025  0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.051*** -0.002  0.052***  0.009 
   Pending Home Sales  0.021  0.005 -0.010  0.000 -0.022*** -0.003**  0.015  0.001 
   Empire Manufacturing  0.046*** -0.001  0.052*  0.005 -0.046*** -0.002  0.042*** -0.002 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  0.036 -0.009  0.131*** -0.006 -0.037*** -0.003  0.041***  0.003 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.054*** -0.001  0.014  0.000 -0.046*** -0.001  0.037***  0.000 
Nr. Obs.   985    985    985    985 
 




Table A-7: Absolute Value of Surprises and MPU 
This table reports estimation results for the following regression: |𝑆𝑚𝑡| = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise for the announcement of type m, and MPU denotes the 
monetary policy uncertainty variable, computed as explained in section 3.3. The sample period 
is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Only the announcements that are significant 
according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively.  
 𝑎0 𝑎1 
Real Activity 
  
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.417  0.379 
   Initial Unemployment Claims  0.817*** -0.089 
   Nonfarm Employment  1.301*** -0.634 
   Unemployment rate  1.765*** -1.145* 
   ADP Employment  2.219*** -1.800*** 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.401  0.474 
   Existing Home Sales  0.290  0.583 
   Personal Income  1.431* -1.152 
Consumption 
  
   New Home Sales  0.538  0.223 
Investment 
  
   Durable Goods Orders  0.740* -0.157 
Government Purchases 
  
   Government Budget  0.835 -0.237 
Prices 
  
   Producer Price Index  0.443  0.442 
Forward Looking 
  
   ISM Manufacturing  1.015** -0.303 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.942*** -0.152 
   Consumer Confidence  0.747**  0.109 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  1.100*** -0.286 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final  1.468*** -0.915** 
   Housing Starts  0.819** -0.063 
   Pending Home Sales  0.422  0.422 
   Empire Manufacturing  0.916** -0.090 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  1.075*** -0.337 





Table A-8: Investor Disagreement and MPU 
This table reports estimation results for the following regression: 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑚  is the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts for announcement m, and MPU denotes 
the monetary policy uncertainty measured as explained in section 3.3. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 
12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix. Only the announcements that are significant according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively.  
 
Announcement 𝑎𝑜 𝑎1 
Real Activity 
  
   GDP (advance, preliminary, final)   0.214**  0.042 
   Initial Unemployment Claims  8.397*** -1.990 
   Nonfarm Employment  26.222*** -3.317 
   Unemployment rate  0.096*** -0.013 
   ADP Employment  27.417*** -9.760** 
   Advance Retail Sales  0.279*** -0.084* 
   Existing Home Sales  0.070*** -0.002 
   Personal Income  0.279** -0.182 
Consumption 
  
   New Home Sales  6.416***  5.404** 
Investment 
  
   Durable Goods Orders  1.597*** -0.225 
Government Purchases 
  
   Government Budget  11.099  2.988 
Prices 
  
   Producer Price Index  0.369*** -0.238*** 
Forward Looking 
  
   ISM Manufacturing  0.677***  0.018 
   ISM Non-manufacturing  0.676***  0.032 
   Consumer Confidence  2.300*** -0.783*** 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Prelim  1.631*** -0.400* 
   U. of Michigan Conf-Final  1.049*** -0.269 
   Housing Starts  9.161**  17.292*** 
   Pending Home Sales  1.708*** -0.497* 
   Empire Manufacturing  3.272*** -0.992** 
   Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook  2.674***  0.086 
   Chicago Purchasing Manager  0.923***  0.483* 
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Table A-9: Average Effect of MPU on the Market Response to Macroeconomic News                  
(with moving average of realized volatility as proxy for MPU) 
Panel A reports the estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡.  𝑅𝑡 is the 
continuously compounded return of the S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, the U.S. Dollar Index futures, the WTI crude oil futures, or 
the change in the Eurodollar rate of the stated contract maturity or the change in the 5-year Treasury yield. The returns and rate changes are computed 
from five minutes before to five minutes after a macroeconomic news release. 𝑆𝑚𝑡 is the standardized surprise for announcement m. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 measures 
monetary policy uncertainty as the moving average of the past 21 trading days of the daily realized volatility of Eurodollar futures with 8-9 quarters to 
expiration. ?̂?𝑚 estimates are obtained from running the regression in equation (4) using the part of the sample before May 22, 2013. Panel B reports the 
estimates of the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, 
where 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the CBOE's Volatility Index measuring the market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. 
Panel C reports the estimates of the model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏𝑀𝑃𝑈  𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑏𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑈𝐶𝑈𝐶𝑡 + 𝑏𝑆 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22





𝑚=1 𝑅𝐴𝑡 + 𝑐𝑈𝐶 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑈𝐶𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑅𝐴𝑡 and 𝑈𝐶𝑡 are the risk aversion and the uncertainty components of the VIX index and are 
constructed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013).  For all panels, only the announcements that are significant according 
to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 12/15/2015. The regressions are estimated using OLS 
with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Basic Regression 𝑏𝑆 𝑐𝑀𝑃𝑈 𝑐𝑉𝐼𝑋 𝑐𝑅𝐴 𝑐𝑈𝐶  𝑅
2 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=985) 
   S&P 500  1.397*** -1.166*** - - - 20.65% 
   10-year Treasury note   0.416*  1.095*** - - - 48.03% 
   U.S. Dollar Index -0.141  2.216*** - - - 27.78% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.784*** -1.832*** - - - 6.73%    
  
  




   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -1.177  4.829*** - - - 22.21% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.965*  3.759*** - - - 45.76% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.259  2.261*** - - - 52.69% 
   5-year Treasury note -0.428  2.681*** - - - 49.02% 
Panel B: Controlling for the VIX        
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=984) 
   S&P 500  0.082 -1.094***  0.285*** - - 26.91% 
   10-year Treasury note   0.561  1.086*** -0.031 - - 48.12% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  0.644  2.182*** -0.173 - - 28.13% 
   WTI Crude Oil  0.779* -1.709***  0.206*** - - 8.20%    
   
 
Medium-term interest rates (N=984) 
  
   
 
   Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -0.245  4.777*** -0.208 - - 22.18% 
   Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -0.151  3.738*** -0.181 - - 45.66% 
   Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  0.340  2.202*** -0.128 - - 52.06% 
   5-year Treasury note  0.238  2.651*** -0.146 - - 48.62% 
Panel C: Controlling for the VIX components 
Stock, bond, foreign exchange and crude oil (N=960) 
   S&P 500  0.394 -1.115*** -  0.022***  0.081 24.65% 
   10-year Treasury note   2.445***  1.251*** -  0.009 -0.266*** 48.56% 
   U.S. Dollar Index  2.030**  2.252*** - -0.001 -0.250** 29.75% 
   WTI Crude Oil  1.159 -1.713*** -  0.019***  0.036 7.72%  
   
  
 
Medium-term interest rates (N=960)    
  
 
    Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration  5.051*  5.603*** -  0.029 -0.846** 23.35% 
    Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration  3.116***  4.210*** -  0.014 -0.540*** 47.35% 
    Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration  2.285***  2.448*** -  0.005 -0.325*** 52.75% 




Table A-10: Effect of Monetary Policy Uncertainty on the Market Response to 
Macroeconomic News (OLS and Weighted Least Squares estimates) 
The table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝑐 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 + 𝑐 ∑ ?̂?𝑚𝑆𝑚𝑡
22
𝑚=1 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡. 𝑅𝑡 is either the continuously compounded return of the S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury note futures, the 
U.S. Dollar Index futures, the WTI crude oil futures, or the change in the Eurodollar rate of the stated contract maturity 
or the change in the 5-year Treasury yield. The returns and rate changes are computed from five minutes before to 
five minutes after a macroeconomic news release. 𝑆𝑚𝑡  is the standardized surprise for announcement m. 𝑀𝑃𝑈𝑡  is the 
monetary policy uncertainty variable measured as explained in section 3.3. ?̂?𝑚 estimates are obtained from running 
the regression in equation (4) using the part of the sample before May 22, 2013. Only the announcements that are 
significant according to the joint Wald test listed in Table 1-4 are included. The sample period is from 01/26/2012 to 
12/15/2015. The results in Panel A are based on OLS with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix. The results in Panel B are obtained with weighted least squares (WLS).  *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively 
 c d R2 
Panel A: OLS with White (1980) standard errors 
   
S&P 500  1.560 (0.24)*** -1.374 (0.29)*** 20.98% 
10-year Treasury note   0.296 (0.28)  1.242 (0.38)*** 47.89% 
U.S. Dollar Index -0.514 (0.66)  2.680 (0.86)*** 27.73% 
WTI Crude Oil  1.895 (0.31)*** -1.975 (0.38)*** 6.39% 
    
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -2.086 (1.22)*  5.974 (1.71)*** 22.34% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -1.509 (0.58)***  4.440 (0.79)*** 45.82% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -0.475 (0.36)  2.529 (0.48)*** 52.28% 
5-year Treasury note -0.762 (0.45)*  3.098 (0.60)*** 48.82% 
    
Panel B: Weighted Least Squares 
   
S&P 500  1.546 (0.14)*** -1.312 (0.17)*** 25.51% 
10-year Treasury note   0.247 (0.21)  1.271 (0.26)*** 50.98% 
U.S. Dollar Index -0.335 (0.34)  2.540 (0.43)*** 37.93% 
WTI Crude Oil  1.936 (0.23)*** -2.022 (0.28)*** 9.30% 
    
Eurodollar 4-5 quarters to expiration -3.712 (1.14)***  9.175 (1.38)*** 25.53% 
Eurodollar 8-9 quarters to expiration -2.349 (0.35)***  5.634 (0.44)*** 57.37% 
Eurodollar 12-13 quarters to expiration -1.089 (0.17)***  3.363 (0.23)*** 63.56% 






Figure A-1. Moving Average of Realized Volatility of Eurodollar Futures  
with 8-9 Quarters to Expiration (%) 
This figure shows an alternative proxy for monetary policy uncertainty computed as the moving average of the past 








The main goal of this essay is to investigate whether systematic ambiguity impacts the cross-
section of stock returns. There has been a substantial amount of research on how investors make 
decisions when facing risk and on how systematic risk affects the cross-section of stock returns. 
In contrast, the effect of ambiguity, also known as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) is less 
known. Knight (1921) was the first to make the distinction between the two dimensions of 
uncertainty. While risk refers to uncertainty regarding future potential outcomes, ambiguity refers 
to uncertainty with respect to the probabilities of those potential outcomes. 
Based on subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954), the variables influencing an 
uncertain choice are the potential outcomes and the probabilities associated with each potential 
outcome. In other words, the confidence of these probabilities does not play any (obvious) role. 
However, empirical research and various experiments have shown that the confidence of these 
probabilities matters, and that people are more willing to bet on risky outcomes than on ambiguous 
ones, holding the probability of outcomes constant. In reality, individual choices violate the 
postulates of subjective expected utility, as in for example, the well-known Ellsberg’s paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961).2 In this paper, we distinguish between risk and ambiguity, and construct a 
measure of systematic ambiguity based on the theoretical framework of expected utility with 
uncertain probabilities (EUUP) proposed by Izhakian (2017).  
                                                          
1 This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Ann Marie Hibbert. 
2As an illustration, consider a choice between two decks of cards: (i) with 10 red and 10 blue cards (the risky deck), 
and (ii) with 20 red or blue cards, but the split between red and blue cards is completely unknown (the ambiguous 
deck). A bet on the color of a random card drawn for either deck pays a fixed sum if a card with the chosen color is 




Most of the previous work on ambiguity is theoretical in nature and accounts for investors’ 
attitudes towards ambiguity, rather than measuring the degree of ambiguity per se.3 These 
theoretical models do not generally simultaneously distinguish between risk, ambiguity, attitudes 
towards risk, and attitudes towards ambiguity.4 However, this separation is essential to quantify 
ambiguity appropriately. In our paper, we follow the procedure of Brenner and Izhakian (2017) 
and measure systematic ambiguity by the variance of probabilities of future potential outcomes. 
Relative to previous research, Brenner and Izhakian (2017) show that this measure is independent 
of risk, attitudes towards risk, and attitudes towards ambiguity. Furthermore, our measure is 
different from other empirical proxies of ambiguity used in the literature, such as the VIX index 
(Williams, 2015), or the variance risk premium (Drechsler, 2013; Zhou, 2015).  
Our second goal is to examine whether ambiguity affects the price discovery process in the 
stock market. We focus our analysis on times when earnings news is released, and investigate how 
ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to such news. Veronesi (1999) shows that the time-
varying discount rate can change with the level of uncertainty. We therefore anticipate that 
ambiguity can influence the stock market reaction to earnings news by affecting returns directly 
via the rate used to discount future cash flows. We also anticipate that during times of elevated 
ambiguity, analysts make less accurate forecasts, and so earnings surprises are larger in magnitude, 
relative to periods of low ambiguity. This can affect the stock market reaction to earnings news, 
                                                          
3 See for example Epstein and Schneider (2008), Cao, Wang, Zhang (2005), Chen and Epstein (2002). For a recent 
survey, please see Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013). 
4 For example, under the max-min expected utility framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the set of priors 
reflect both beliefs (i.e. information) and tastes (attitudes towards ambiguity), but these two concepts are not separable. 
Furthermore, the Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory (Schmeidler, 1989) deals with both ambiguity and aversion 




as earnings surprises of larger magnitude usually have a smaller stock market marginal response 
to earnings news (Freeman and Tse, 1992).  
This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to 
research on the relation between systematic ambiguity and the cross-section of stock returns, by 
showing that during times of elevated ambiguity, investors require a premium for ambiguity, in 
addition to the premium they require for bearing risk. Our finding that systematic ambiguity is 
priced in the cross-section of stock returns complements the findings of Brenner and Izhakian 
(2017), who find that ambiguity has a significant impact on the excess return of the market 
portfolio. We also perform an in-depth analysis of the types of firms that are more impacted by 
this uncertainty factor by forming long-short portfolios based on various firm characteristics such 
as those that are measures of information asymmetry. Our results indicate that when ambiguity is 
expected to increase, stocks of firms with high information asymmetry; firms which are difficult 
to value and/or arbitrage, such as firms that are smaller, riskier, and less profitable; non-dividend 
payers, and firms with higher levels of earnings management, underperform their counterparts.  
These findings suggest the need to extend modern portfolio theory, i.e. the mean-variance 
framework, to account for ambiguity as another dimension, in addition to the mean and standard 
deviation of returns (risk). We show that during normal times, i.e. when ambiguity is low, the 
standard risk-return relation holds. Specifically, riskier portfolios provide a higher return. On the 
other hand, during more uncertain times, characterized by high ambiguity, riskier portfolios 
provide lower returns, in violation of the standard positive risk-return relation.  
Finally, we contribute to research on the relation between asset prices and firm-specific 
fundamentals by showing that ambiguity is an important determinant of the market response to 




on the state of the economy (Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan, 2005; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, 
and Vega, 2007), limited investor attention (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Dellavigna and 
Pollet, 2009), investor sentiment (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012), and market implied 
volatility (Williams, 2015). We contribute to this literature by showing that the stock market 
reaction to firm-specific news depends on the level of systematic ambiguity. Our results show that 
in times of elevated ambiguity, the stock market reacts less severely to bad earnings news. 
Furthermore, this weaker reaction is more significant for stocks of firms that have greater 
information asymmetry, are small, old, unprofitable, and riskier. Our results remain robust after 
controlling for other factors that could affect the stock market reaction to earnings news, such as 
the state of the economy, real business conditions, the VIX, the VIX components (risk aversion 
and stock market uncertainty as in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013)), sentiment, and investor 
attention. This finding suggests that ambiguity reduces stock market efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
introduces our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the construction of our ambiguity measure. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical tests and the results of our hypotheses, while section 6 
provides the results of robustness checks.  We provide concluding remarks in Section 7. 
2.2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
 
2.2.1. Measuring Ambiguity 
A good measure of ambiguity needs to be independent of attitudes towards ambiguity (i.e. tastes 
for ambiguity), risk, and attitudes towards risk. To emphasize the importance of this separation, 




towards risk was a crucial step towards empirically measuring risk independently of risk attitudes, 
and towards the investigation of risk attitudes independently of risk (Izhakian, 2017).   
The models of decision making under ambiguity have been evolving towards the separation 
between ambiguity and risk, and between tastes (i.e. preferences/attitudes) and beliefs (i.e. 
information). For example, in the Choquet expected utility theory (CEU) of Schmeidler (1989) 
and the max-min expected utility theory (MEU) of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), ambiguity is 
distinguished from risk. Subsequently, the separation between tastes and beliefs regarding 
ambiguity is introduced by the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝐸𝑈 theory of Ghirardato, Klibanoff, and Marinacci (1998), 
and then improved by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). 
The theory of expected utility with uncertain probabilities (EUUP) of Izhakian (2017) 
introduces a theoretical framework to measure ambiguity independently of attitudes towards 
ambiguity, risk, and attitudes towards risk. Under this framework, the decision-making process 
consists of two stages. During the first stage, also known as the ‘probability formation phase’, the 
decision maker forms his perceived probabilities of all future potential outcomes that are important 
for his decision. In the second stage, also known as ‘the valuation phase’, the decision maker 
evaluates all future potential outcomes given his perceived probabilities, and acts consequently. 
Ambiguity is characteristic of the first stage, since ambiguity refers to uncertainty about 
probabilities, while risk is characteristic of the second stage, as it refers to uncertainty about 
consequences. Under the EUUP theory, ambiguity can be measured directly from data. For 
instance, if risk is generally proxied by the volatility of outcomes, the EUUP theory allows us to 
empirically measure ambiguity by the volatility of probabilities. In addition, if Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970) define risk aversion as aversion towards mean-preserving spreads in outcomes, the 




preserving spreads in probabilities. Attitudes towards ambiguity can then be attained directly from 
the ambiguity premium, as shown by Brenner and Izhakian (2017). In this essay, we focus on the 
degree of systematic ambiguity and not on attitudes towards ambiguity. 
Empirical applications of ambiguity computed based on the EUUP theory have mainly 
been used in the corporate finance literature, as for example when investigating the effect of 
ambiguity on payout policy (Herron and Izhakian, 2018), the importance of ambiguity in capital 
structure decisions (Izhakian, Yermack, and Zender, 2017), and the importance of ambiguity in 
executives’ stock option exercise decisions (Izhakian and Yermack, 2017). Our ambiguity measure 
is constructed based on the EUUP theory, but our application focuses on asset pricing and market 
efficiency. We investigate the impact of systematic ambiguity on the cross-section of stock returns, 
complementing the work of Brenner and Izhakian (2017), who investigate the role of systematic 
ambiguity on the excess return of the market portfolio.  
 Other empirical measures of ambiguity (obtained from market data, as opposed to 
controlled experiments) used in the literature are the entropy of information (Ulrich, 2013), the 
disagreement among analysts (Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens, 2009), the variance risk premium 
(Drechsler, 2013; Zhou, 2015), and the CBOE VIX index (Williams, 2015). Ulrich (2013) shows 
that ambiguity about trend inflation explains the time-varying term premium in the nominal U.S. 
Treasury bond yields. Ulrich assumes that the benchmark model for trend inflation comes from 
the median one-quarter ahead inflation forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
However, the investor is exposed to ambiguity, because he is uncertain about the true model for 
trend inflation. Therefore, the investor compares all potential models that could have generated the 
exogenous process in the economy via a likelihood ratio test. Ambiguity, or the amount of relative 




model. The investor requires an inflation ambiguity premium for unpredictable changes in trend 
inflation (relative entropy). In Ulrich’s study, the investor has max-min preferences, meaning that 
he evaluates his expected lifetime utility under the worst-case scenario. This max-min expected 
utility framework captures both ambiguity and attitudes towards ambiguity, but does not 
distinguish between the two. In the current paper, we empirically measure the degree of systematic 
ambiguity, which is independent of attitudes towards ambiguity.   
Another representative paper is the work of Drechsler (2013), who develops a model where 
a representative investor makes consumption and portfolio choice decisions, but faces ambiguity 
regarding the true model governing the economic fundamentals. Drechsler shows that the 
ambiguity about the true model is directly related to variance risk premium. The representative 
investor pays a large premium for equity index options because he hedges misspecification 
concerns about the model. Drechsler argues that a good measure for this premium is the difference 
between the option-implied expectations of return variance (such as the VIX) and the statistical 
(i.e. true) expectations of return variance. The option-implied expectation is equivalent to a 
variance swap that pays the buyer the realized variance over the lifetime of the contract. By buying 
the swap, the buyer receives protection against high realized variance. The difference between the 
swap price and the true expectation of variance is the (variance) premium investors pay for this 
hedge. Thus, the representative investor’s desire to hedge his model uncertainty concerns leads to 
a price premium in index options, and the magnitude of this premium depends on the level of 
model uncertainty. The variance risk premium is also used to measure ambiguity by Zhou (2015), 
when studying the stock market reaction to macroeconomic announcements. However, the 
variance risk premium used as a measure of ambiguity does not allow the separation between 




been used in the literature as a proxy of risk aversion (Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca, 2013). In the 
current paper, we use a measure of the degree of systematic ambiguity that is different (by 
construction) from risk, attitudes towards risk, and attitudes towards ambiguity.  
Ambiguity has also been empirically measured by the CBOE VIX Index in Williams’s 
(2015) study of the stock market reaction to earnings news. Again, the VIX index does not allow 
the separation of attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity. Our ambiguity measure, 
described in section 2.3, measures the degree of systematic ambiguity and not attitudes towards 
ambiguity, and is negatively correlated with the VIX index and the variance risk premium.   
2.2.2. Ambiguity in Asset Pricing 
We aim to shed light on the impact of systematic ambiguity on the cross-section of stock returns. 
There is ample evidence that the difference in the cross-section of stock returns is not only driven 
by compensation for systematic risk. In his survey paper on this topic, Subrahmanyam (2010) 
documents at least 50 variables used in the literature to predict stock returns in the cross-section, 
and summarizes them in four main categories: the ‘informal Wall Street wisdom’ including 
predictors that are not based on a theoretical reasoning, but are motivated by the wisdom of finance 
professionals, behavioral biases, frictions, and the theoretical motivation based on risk-return 
models. Considering ambiguity as a missing factor in asset pricing models has been mainly 
addressed from a theoretical perspective. For example, Izhakian and Benninga (2011) and Epstein 
and Schneider (2010) include ambiguity in their pricing model and argue that ambiguity can be 
one potential determinant of expected returns.  
More closely related to our work is the recent paper by Brenner and Izhakian (2017), who 
empirically show that the market excess return is significantly affected by systematic ambiguity. 




excess return internationally, during the period of 1990 to 2012. In contrast to these two papers, 
we investigate whether systematic ambiguity affects the cross-section of stock returns directly and 
state our first hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 1: Ambiguity has a significant impact on the cross-section of stock returns. 
According to the intertemporal capital asset pricing model of Merton (1973), investors have 
incentives to protect themselves against future stochastic shifts in investment and consumption 
opportunity sets. Since greater systematic ambiguity can reduce future consumption and 
investment opportunities, it can also have an impact on investors’ intertemporal hedging demand 
for the future. This can ultimately affect asset prices and returns.  
If ambiguity matters for the cross-section of stock returns, what types of stocks are more 
attractive to investors during periods of elevated ambiguity? Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) 
show that in times of high uncertainty, agents move towards holding un-contingent and safe assets. 
They develop a model of crises and central bank policy that incorporates ambiguity, and claim that 
severe flight to quality episodes do not only involve risk about asset payoffs, but also uncertainty 
about the environment. This suggests that although ambiguity-averse investors are reluctant to 
hold ambiguous assets in general (Bossaerts, Ghirardo, Guarnascheli, and Zame, 2010), such as 
assets with high information asymmetry, the ‘flight to quality’ phenomenon seems to be even more 
severe in times of elevated ambiguity, when investors are expected to move towards ‘safe’ assets. 




‘When confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty, human beings 
invariably attempt to disengage from medium to long-term commitments in favor of safety 
and liquidity…’, Alan Greenspan (2004)5 
Furthermore, research in the neuroscience literature shows that when investors make 
decisions in the presence of high ambiguity, the area in the brain responsible for fear and survival 
instincts (called the amygdala) is activated (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer, 2005). Hsu, 
et. al (2005) also show that in the presence of uncertainty, ‘the brain is alerted… that information 
is missing…, and that cognitive and behavioral resources must be mobilized in order to seek out 
additional information from the environment’ (pp. 1683). Motivated by this finding, we conjecture 
that stocks that provide this additional information readily, would be more attractive during times 
of elevated systematic ambiguity. These stocks would most likely have low levels of information 
asymmetry (consistent with Bossaerts, Ghirardo, Guarnascheli, and Zame (2010)) and would be 
easy to value/arbitrage.  
Stocks that are easy to value/arbitrage are more attractive than their counterparts during 
times of elevated ambiguity. Hard-to-arbitrage stocks are more frequently and more severely 
mispriced (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002), and the mispricing might last even longer during 
times of high ambiguity. In fact, when uncertainty is high, arbitrageurs may be reluctant to incur 
the potentially large costs of trying to exploit the arbitrage opportunity (Merton, 1987). 
Furthermore, the arbitrage activity can be deterred until arbitrageurs are able to determine the 
expected payoff with more accuracy. In addition, the expected payoff must be above the fixed 
costs to set up the arbitrage (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 2002). We would therefore expect 
                                                          




that easy-to-value/arbitrage stocks would be more attractive than their counterparts during times 
of elevated systematic ambiguity. We state our second and third hypotheses as: 
Hypothesis 2: During periods of high ambiguity, stocks with high information asymmetry 
underperform their counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3: During periods of high ambiguity, stocks that are hard to value/arbitrage 
underperform their counterparts. 
Our proxies for information asymmetry and difficulty to arbitrage are motivated by the 
prior literature. For example, Berger and Turtle (2012) show that firms with high information 
asymmetry (or opaque firms) tend to be volatile, small, young and intangible. In addition, 
Richardson (2000) and Schipper (1989) argue that for firms with high information asymmetry, the 
practice of earnings management is sustained by the fact that stakeholders do not have access to 
sufficient resources, incentives, or relevant information to monitor the manager’s actions. 
Arbitrage tends to be costly and risky for young, small, unprofitable, and extreme growth stocks 
because of their high idiosyncratic risk (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002), their greater trading 
costs (Amihud and Mendelsohn, 1986), and their short selling difficulty (Duffie, Garleanu, and 
Pedersen, 2002). According to Baker and Wurgler (2006), hard-to-arbitrage stocks are highly 
volatile, young, small, unprofitable, non-dividend paying, and extreme growth stocks.  
In our empirical tests we consider the following characteristics: idiosyncratic volatility, 
size, age, tangibility, profitability, book-to-market value, the level of earnings management, and 




2.2.3. Ambiguity and Market Efficiency 
We also investigate whether ambiguity affects the price discovery process in the stock market. We 
focus our analysis on times when earnings news is released, and empirically investigate whether 
ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to such news. Previous theoretical work describes how 
new information gets impounded into asset prices under different economic environments. For 
example, the theoretical rational expectations equilibrium model of Veronesi (1999) describes how 
uncertainty about the state of the economy can make investors in the stock market underreact to 
good economic news in bad times and overreact to bad economic news in good times. If bad news 
arrives and investors believe that the economy is in a good state, investors tend to become more 
uncertain about the state of the economy, causing the discount rate to increase. This strengthens 
the negative impact of news on prices. Similarly, if good economic news arrives when investors 
believe that the economy is in a bad state, investors again become more uncertain about the state 
of the economy, causing the discount rate to increase. This weakens the positive impact of news 
on prices.  
We anticipate that ambiguity can affect the stock market reaction to earnings news through 
its impact on the time-varying discount rate, which can change with the level of uncertainty 
(Veronessi, 1999).6 At the same time, we expect that during periods of elevated ambiguity, analysts 
make less accurate forecasts and so earnings surprises can be greater in magnitude. Earnings 
surprises of greater magnitude have a smaller marginal response of the stock return to the news 
(Freeman and Tse, 1992). We state our fourth and fifth hypotheses as:  
                                                          
6 Previous research shows that the equity (risk) premium increases during times of greater uncertainty (Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2013; Andrei and Hasler, 2014; Brogaard and Detzel, 2012). However, these studies do not distinguish 
between risk and ambiguity. Brenner and Izhakian (2017) show that the equity premium consists of risk premium 




Hypothesis 4: Systematic ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to earnings news.  
Hypothesis 5: Greater systematic ambiguity increases the magnitude of the earnings 
surprise.   
A paper related to our analysis is the work of Williams (2015), who investigates how a 
shock in ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to earnings news. Williams measures 
ambiguity by the CBOE VIX index and finds that following an increase in the VIX, investors 
respond asymmetrically, weighting bad news more than good news. However, relative to Williams 
(2015), we consider different channels through which ambiguity can affect the stock market 
reaction to earnings news. Furthermore, our systematic ambiguity measure is independent (by 
construction) of risk, attitudes towards risk, and attitudes towards ambiguity, while the VIX 
measure does not separate between them. Our ambiguity measure is significantly negatively 
correlated with the VIX index and this is consistent with Brenner and Izhakian (2017), who provide 
evidence that the ambiguity measure based on the EUUP theory does not capture the same aspects 
of uncertainty as the VIX. However, to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the 
VIX Index, we control for the VIX and the VIX components (risk aversion and stock market 
uncertainty computed as described in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca (2013)) in our analysis.  
2.3. The Ambiguity Measure 
 
2.3.1. The Ambiguity Measure 
We measure systematic ambiguity by the variance of probabilities of future potential outcomes, 
following the procedure of Izhakian (2017), Brenner and Izhakian (2017), and Izhakian and 




By construction, this ambiguity measure is independent of risk, which is commonly proxied by the 
variance of future potential outcomes. The measure is also independent of attitudes towards risk 
and/or attitudes towards ambiguity7, which are defined as attitudes towards mean-preserving 
spreads in outcomes (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970), and attitudes towards mean-preserving spread 
in the probabilities of future potential outcomes, respectively (Izhakian, 2017).  
However, in contrast to Brenner and Izhakian (2017), our ambiguity measure is obtained 
by using 5-minute intraday data for the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract, which is now the most 
popular equity index futures contract in the world. Also, our sample period is from September 9, 
1997 until December 31, 2017. The starting date of our sample corresponds to the date when the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange introduced the E-mini S&P 500 contract. Furthermore, we construct 
a measure of systematic ambiguity at the daily frequency, instead of monthly frequency. That is, 
the set of priors of the representative investor for any given day consists of 22 different probability 
distributions of the stock index: the probability distributions of the current day and of the previous 
21 trading days.  
We inspect the distribution of returns across the entire sample period, and eliminate 
observations below the first percentile and above the 99th percentile. For each day in our sample 
period, there are between 23 and 78 observations. To compute a daily measure of systematic 
ambiguity, we represent every daily return distribution by a histogram. We divide the range of 
returns in 20 different bins and for every day we calculate the probability of the future return being 
                                                          
7 Brenner and Izhakian (2017) show that the ambiguity measure obtained based on the EUUP theory is by construction 




in each bin.8 We calculate the mean and the variance of probabilities for each of the 20 bins 
separately, and then estimate ambiguity as in relation (14) in Izhakian and Yermack (2017).   
 We plot our ambiguity variable in Panel A of Figure 2-1. The degree of ambiguity varies 
significantly over our sample period, experiencing relatively greater values towards the end of the 
sample. Although ambiguity is relatively lower in the first part of our sample, it does capture 
important events such as the beginning of the Russian financial crisis in August 1998, the 
beginning of the dot-com bubble burst in April 2000, the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the 
corporate accounting scandals in 2002 (particularly after the first quarter of 2002).9 Noticeably, 
our ambiguity measure experiences relatively higher levels from 2004 to 2007, period 
characterized by low levels of realized volatility, as shown in Panel B of Figure 2-1. During the 
recent financial crisis, our ambiguity measure experiences peak values from September 2008 until 
February 2009. More recently, periods with extreme ambiguity were encountered during 
December 2010, December 2013 - January 2014, June to September 2014, December 2014, and 
fall and winter of 2016. In addition, the end of 2017 was characterized by high ambiguity.  
Over the last seven to eight quarters, the volatility of the stock market, or rather the lack of 
it (Panel B of Figure 2-1), has been a widely discussed topic in the financial media. The low levels 
of the CBOE Volatility fear gauge Index (the VIX - in Panel C of Figure 2-1) particularly during 
a time of uncertainty, related either to the unpredictability of the U.S. policy under president 
Donald Trump or to the geopolitical risk posed by North Korea, have raised concerns among 
investors. In an interview on March 15, 2017, professor Menachem Brenner from New York 
                                                          
8 First, we compute the probability of the return being lower than −0.16% (the first bin) and higher than 0.16% (the 
last bin). These values correspond approximately to the fifth and the 95th percentiles of futures returns over our sample 
period. Then we divide the range of returns, i.e. from −0.16% to 0.16%, into 18 equal intervals (bins).  




University, the pioneer of the VIX index, mentioned the need to quantitatively measure ambiguity 
for identifying the uncertainty that is not captured by the VIX.  
‘Volatility alone doesn’t explain expected returns. Higher volatility is higher risk, but that 
is not enough and you also need ambiguity.’ 
Interview with Professor Menachem Brenner10 
 Table 2-1 reports the descriptive statistics of the ambiguity measure, the realized volatility, 
VIX index, and the VIX components: the variance risk premium (RA) and the stock market 
uncertainty (UC) computed as described in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013).11 Our 
ambiguity measure varies from 0.005 to 0.335, having a mean of 0.037. To help us better 
understand how our ambiguity measure (Ʊ2) is related to risk, and to other measures of ambiguity 
used in the literature, Table 2-2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between Ʊ2, the 
realized volatility (𝜈) of the E-mini S&P 500 futures (as a proxy of risk), the VIX, RA, and UC. 
Ambiguity is significantly negatively correlated with the VIX index,12 and with the variance risk 
premium (RA). Furthermore, Table 2-2 shows that ambiguity (Ʊ2) is negatively and weakly 
correlated with the daily realized volatility of E-mini S&P 500 futures, being consistent with the 
fact that ambiguity and risk are different concepts. Our Ʊ2 variable captures the degree of 
ambiguity and not attitudes towards ambiguity. 
2.3.2. Estimating Expected Ambiguity 
To obtain a forward-looking measure of ambiguity, we estimate the expected ambiguity for each 
day in our sample, by applying a similar procedure to Brenner and Izhakian (2017), but we adjust 
                                                          
10 https://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Equities/Volatility-index-creator-seeks-to-invent-new-tool-to-measure-
ambiguity?page=1  
11 We denote variance risk premium by RA because in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013), it is used to proxy for 
the level of risk aversion in the market. 




the procedure to daily frequency. We assume that when investors form expectations about future 
ambiguity, they also look at how ambiguity evolved over time. We find that the square root of 
ambiguity (i.e. Ʊ) is positively skewed. So, in order to avoid negative values of conditional 
ambiguity and to adjust for skewness, we examine the natural logarithm of Ʊ.  
The correlogram of ln (Ʊ) from Table 2-3 indicates that an autoregressive moving average 
(ARMA) model would be appropriate for estimating expected ambiguity ln (Ʊ)̂. We estimate the 
ARMA(p, q) model in (3) for each day, and select the optimal number of lags corresponding to 
the highest quality model, i.e. the model with the lowest Akaike (AIC) information criterion. Every 
day, we use data from the previous 30 months (i.e. the previous 660 trading days: from day t-660 
to day t-1) to estimate the regression in (3) for each combination of p and q (p=1, …, 10 and q=1, 
…, 10). We have in total about p*q=100 combinations of (p, q) pairs for each day. After selecting 
the optimal number of lags, we estimate ln Ʊ𝑡+1̂  and then the expected ambiguity (Ʊ𝑡+1
2 )𝐸 similar 
to relation (16) in Yermack and Izhakian (2017). The plot of expected ambiguity in Figure 2-2 
shows that the expected and the raw measures of ambiguity evolve similarly over time.  
2.4. Data 
 
2.4.1. Firm-Specific Characteristics 
Our initial sample includes all U.S. companies with data in CRSP and Compustat. We limit our 
sample to only firms that: 1) are listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, 2) are not utilities or financial 
companies (SIC code between 4900-4999 and 6000-6999), and 3) have CRSP share code 10 or 11 
(ordinary common share). The final sample consists of 8401 firms for which we collect daily 




The start date of our sample is chosen based on the availability of the ambiguity measure described 
in section 2.3.1.   
We collect the Fama and French (2016) five factors and the one-month Treasury bill rate 
from Kenneth French’s website. We match the quarterly data from Compustat with the daily 
variables from CRSP and ensure that the accounting variables from Compustat are known before 
the returns they are used to explain. For example, we use a 6-month (minimum) gap between the 
fiscal year-end and the daily CRSP data (similarly to the procedure of Fama and Frech (1992)).  
 Table 2-4 reports the summary statistics of the firm-specific characteristics used in our 
analysis for the full sample (Panel A), and the difference in means for these characteristics between 
periods of high and low ambiguity (Panel B). The average firm in our analysis has a market cap 
(i.e. size, measured as price times shares outstanding) of 1.2 billions of dollars. The firm’s 𝑎𝑔𝑒 is 
calculated by the number of years since the firm appeared in CRSP for the first time, rounded to 
the nearest month. The average 𝑎𝑔𝑒 of firms in our analysis is approximately 17 years. Since prior 
work mentions that stock volatility can be perceived as a good proxy for the difficulty of valuation 
and arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler, 2006), we also compute 𝜎 as the standard deviation of the daily 
returns over the previous 22 trading days. 𝜎 is on average smaller during periods of high ambiguity 
relative to periods of low ambiguity.  
According to Baker and Wurgler (2006), asset tangibility can be a good proxy for the 
difficulty of valuation. As measures of asset tangibility, we include the research and development 
expense over assets, 𝑅𝐷/𝐴 and the level of property, plant, and equipment over assets, 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴.  
We do not see a significant difference in 𝑅𝐷/𝐴 (on average) between periods of high and low 
ambiguity. However, 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴 is higher on average during times of elevated ambiguity. As a proxy 




Jones (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).13 The absolute value of discretionary 
accruals seems to be larger on average during times of low ambiguity relative to periods of high 
ambiguity. In addition, for capturing growth opportunities, we include in our analysis the book-to-
market equity, 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸.  
As dividend characteristic, we consider the dividend on equity variable, (𝐷𝑖𝑣 ∗
𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡)/𝐵𝐸, calculated as the number of shares outstanding from Compustat (𝑆ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) times the 
dividend per share at the ex-dividend date (𝐷𝑖𝑣), divided by the book value of equity (𝐵𝐸). 𝐵𝐸 is 
calculated as shareholders’ equity together with balance sheet deferred taxes. We include in our 
analysis a dummy variable (𝐷) which is one for firms with positive values of 𝐷𝑖𝑣, by the ex-
dividend date, and 0 otherwise. As profitability characteristic (used later in our analysis), we 
consider the return on equity, 𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝐵𝐸, taking positive values for firms that are 
profitable and zero otherwise. If earnings are positive, the variable 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 refers to the income 
statement deferred taxes together with the income before extraordinary items and without preferred 
dividends. We include in our analysis a dummy variable (𝐸) to help us distinguish between 
profitable and unprofitable firms. 𝐸 is one for profitable firms and zero otherwise.  
2.4.2. Control Variables 
We report descriptive statistics of the main control variables employed in our analysis in Table 2-
5. Panel A summarizes these statistics across our entire sample period, while Panels B and C 
summarize the statistics for periods of high and low ambiguity respectively. Panel D provides a 
test of the difference in the means of our control variables during times of high vs. low expected 
ambiguity. The low (high) ambiguity periods are those periods where the expected ambiguity is 
                                                          




below (above) its sample median. The market excess return is not significantly different on average 
between periods of high and low ambiguity. However, the size (SMB), the value (HML), and the 
investment (CMA) factors of Fama and French (2016) experience lower levels on average during 
times of high ambiguity relative to periods of low ambiguity.  
2.5. Ambiguity in Asset Pricing 
2.5.1. Long-Short Portfolios by Firm Characteristics 
For understanding whether ambiguity is priced, and whether it is priced differently across various 
categories of stocks, we form equally-weighted portfolios that are long on stocks with high values 
of a firm characteristic and short on stocks with low values of the same characteristic. These 
characteristics are: firm 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒, total risk (𝜎), dividends (𝐷), profitability (𝐸), property, plant, 
and equipment over assets (𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-
to-market ratio (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), and discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). We rebalance our portfolios 
every quarter. We compute the 30th and 70th percentiles of each characteristic for the stocks listed 
on NYSE at the end of each quarter. We use these percentiles as benchmarks to determine whether 
stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq have high, medium, or low values of each characteristic. 
Firms in the top (bottom) three NYSE deciles are considered to have high (low) values of a certain 
firm-characteristic. The procedure is similar to Fama and French (2016) and Baker and Wurgler 
(2006).  
2.5.2. Two-way sorts of Stock Returns by Firm Characteristics and Expected Ambiguity 
As a first step in our analysis, we compute the average stock returns of these equally weighted 
portfolios for periods of low, medium, and high levels of expected ambiguity, and plot the results 




ambiguity is in the lowest three deciles across our sample period. Blue bars denote the average 
return during periods of high ambiguity, i.e. when ambiguity is in the highest three deciles across 
our sample period. Black bars denote the average return for when ambiguity is between the lowest 
three deciles and the highest three deciles across our sample period (moderate ambiguity).  
When the expected ambiguity is low, on average, small firms earn higher returns than big 
firms, but this pattern seems to be reversed during times of high expected ambiguity. This result 
shows that the small firm effect is less likely to exist during periods of high ambiguity. Older firms 
seem to gain on average greater returns than young firms when expected ambiguity is low. Again, 
the pattern seems to be reversed during times of high expected ambiguity. Looking at the firm risk 
proxied by the standard deviation of daily returns from the previous 22 trading days, greater risk is 
associated with greater average return during times of low expected ambiguity. However, during 
times of high expected ambiguity, riskier firms earn a lower average return than safer or less risky 
firms. This pattern seems to confirm the different concepts captured by risk and ambiguity.  
For PPE/A and RD/A, we notice that in times of elevated ambiguity, greater asset 
tangibility is associated with lower average returns. We also notice that growth stocks (low 
𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸) earn higher average returns than value stocks (high 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸) during periods of low 
expected ambiguity. However, during times of high expected ambiguity, value stocks seem to 
outperform relative to growth stocks.  
Portfolios formed by taking long positions in dividend paying stocks and short positions in 
non-dividend paying stocks tend to earn positive average returns for moderate levels of expected 
ambiguity. Portfolios formed by taking long positions in profitable firms and short positions in 




average, firms with high level of earnings management underperform relative to their counterparts. 
This underperformance increases in times of elevated expected ambiguity.  
2.5.3. Univariate Evidence 
The results reported in Figure 2-3 suggest that on average, the level of expected ambiguity affects 
the returns of various categories of stocks. However, for understanding if ambiguity matters, we 
need to formally test whether ambiguity significantly affects the returns of long-short portfolio 
formed by the different characteristics. We proceed by regressing the returns of long-short 
portfolios formed by each characteristic on our expected ambiguity variable(𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸). The 
results are reported in Panels A to D of Table 2-6. 
𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛿 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸 + 𝑢𝑡                                    (1) 
The expected ambiguity used in our estimation is 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂? computed as 
described in section 2.3.2. The univariate results indicate that in the presence of greater expected 
ambiguity, the returns of long-short portfolios formed by firm size tend to earn greater returns. This 
means that when facing greater ambiguity, big firms outperform relative to small firms. Greater 
levels of ambiguity decrease the returns of long-short portfolios formed by firm’s age and firm’s 
risk (𝜎). That is, in times of increased ambiguity, younger firms tend to outperform relative to older 
firms. Also, safer firms seem to outperform riskier firms when ambiguity increases.  
Panel B of Table 2-6 shows that in times of increased expected ambiguity, profitable firms 
tend to outperform relative to unprofitable firms. The results in Panel C of the same table indicate 
that value stocks tend to outperform relative to growth stocks in the presence of increased 
ambiguity. Similarly, high RD/A stocks outperform stocks with low RD/A levels in times of 




short portfolios formed by PPE/A. Firms with lower asset tangibility tend to outperform those with 
high asset tangibility in times of increased ambiguity. Greater ambiguity also decreases the returns 
of long-short portfolios formed by absolute value of discretionary accruals. In other words, the 
greater the ambiguity, the more firms with lower earnings management outperform firms with high 
level of earnings management.  
Overall, our univariate results so far are supportive of our first three hypotheses. They 
indicate that ambiguity matters when pricing different categories of stocks. In particular, we find 
that during periods of lower expected ambiguity, stocks that are generally hard to arbitrage and hard 
to value, such as stocks of firms that are small, unprofitable, risky, and stocks of growth companies 
tend to outperform their counterparts. On the other hand, in times of greater expected ambiguity, 
these stocks underperform relative to their counterparts. At the same time, during times of elevated 
ambiguity, stock with high information asymmetry, such as stocks of firms that are small, risky, 
and with high level of earnings management, underperform relative to their counterparts.  
2.5.4. Multivariate Analysis 
Next we investigate whether the expected ambiguity helps explaining the difference in returns 
between different categories of stocks, after controlling for macro-factors that have previously been 
found to help explain stock returns. More precisely, we estimate the regression in (1), while 
separately controlling for the Fama and French (1992) three factors or Fama and French (2016) five 
factors. When controlling for the market excess return, the size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), and the value (𝐻𝑀𝐿) factors 
only, we estimate the regression below:  
𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛿 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡




The expected ambiguity variable 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡
𝐸̃  captures the degree of ambiguity that is not 
reflected in the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 or 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors. Given the strong and negative correlations between ambiguity 
and the size and value factors reported in Table 2-2, we first regress 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸 from (1) on the 
market excess return, the size, and the value factors of Fama and French (1992), and then store the 
residuals as 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡
𝐸̃ . We estimate the model in (2) and report the results in Panels A to D of 
Table 2-6. The estimated 𝛿 ̂is consistent with our previous findings from the univariate setting. We 
find that in general, stocks with high information asymmetry and stocks that are difficult to 
arbitrage/value tend to underperform relative to their counterparts in times of higher expected 
ambiguity. 
We also estimate the regression in (1), while controlling for the Fama and French (2016) 
five factors. That is, in addition to the market excess return, the size (𝑆𝑀𝐵), and the value (𝐻𝑀𝐿) 
factors, we also consider a profitability (𝑅𝑀𝑊) factor and an investment (𝐶𝑀𝐴) factor. We estimate 
the following model:  
𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛿 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ + 𝑏 (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡) + 𝑠 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑂𝑡 +
𝑟 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                    (3) 
 
The variables used in model (3) have been previously introduced. However, in this 
particular case, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑂 denotes the orthogonal value factor from Fama and French (2016). In 
addition, 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  denotes the degree of expected ambiguity that is not captured by the other 
explanatory variables in the regression. 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿  is measured by the residuals obtained when 
regressing 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸 from (1) on the market excess return, size, (orthogonal) value, profitability, 




In general, the results remain consistent with our univariate findings. However, for the 
long-short portfolios obtained by having long positions in dividend-paying stocks and short 
positions in stocks not paying dividends, it seems that in times of increased expected ambiguity, 
the dividend payers tend to outperform non-payers. The result is significant at the 10% significance 
level.  
2.6. Ambiguity and Market Efficiency 
In this section, we investigate whether ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to firm-specific 
earnings announcements. In line with the theory of market efficiency, the stock market should only 
react to the unexpected component of the earnings announcement. We compute the announcement 
surprise as the difference between each firm’s reported earnings per share (EPS) and the latest 
analyst consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date, scaled by the stock price 
two days before the earnings announcement date (similar to Fang, Huan, and Karpoff (2016)). The 
earnings announcements and the analysts’ earnings forecasts data are from the Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
Table 2-7 reports the average size of negative (Panel A) and positive (Panel B) earnings 
surprises during times of high and low ambiguity. The earnings surprise is negative (positive) 
when the value of the announced earnings is below (above) its corresponding value forecasted by 
analysts. Ambiguity is considered low (high) when its expected value is in the bottom (top) three 
deciles across our sample period. The statistics indicate that on average, positive earnings surprises 
are not significantly different during times of high ambiguity, relative to periods of low ambiguity. 
Negative earnings surprises seem to be on average higher in magnitude during times of elevated 




2.6.1. The Stock Market’s Marginal Response to Earnings News  
A firm must have a complete set of financial variables and quarterly announcement dates to be 
included in our sample. Following Ball, Kothari, Shanken (1993) and Williams (2014), we 
eliminate observations with the price less than or equal to $5 at the beginning of the event window 
to reduce the effect of market frictions. For each stock, we compute the daily abnormal return over 
the period of 10 days before to 60 days after each earnings release date. We estimate the market 
model over the period [-61, -11] days before each earnings announcement, and we use the 
estimated coefficients to predict the ‘normal’ values of return for the window [-10, +60] days 
around the earnings release date. We calculate abnormal return as the difference between the actual 
stock return and its ‘normal’ predicted value from the market model.  
 We report the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 3 days [-1, +1], 5 days [-2, 
+2], and 11 days [-5, +5] around the release date of negative and positive earnings surprises in 
Panels A and B of Table 2-7. The average cumulative abnormal return around negative earnings 
surprises is negative and significantly lower in magnitude during times of high ambiguity, relative 
to periods of low ambiguity. The average cumulative abnormal return computed even over the 10 
days period after the release of negative earnings surprises (i.e. 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +10]) is significantly lower 
in magnitude during high ambiguity periods, relative to periods of low ambiguity. On the other 
hand, the average 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +10] following the announcement of positive earnings surprises is 
significantly higher during periods of high ambiguity relative to periods of low ambiguity.    
Figure 2-4 shows the daily average abnormal return for 10 days before to 10 days after the 
earnings announcement date (i.e. day 0). The average abnormal return increases during the 
announcement day of positive earnings surprises (Panel A) and is higher in magnitude during 




decreases during the announcement day of negative earnings surprises (Panel B) and is smaller in 
magnitude during high ambiguity relative to low ambiguity periods. The same pattern is followed 
by the average cumulative abnormal return (Figure 2-5). After negative earnings surprises, the 
average cumulative abnormal return is negative and smaller in magnitude during times of elevated 
ambiguity, relative to periods of low ambiguity. In contrast, after positive earnings surprises, the 
average cumulative abnormal return is higher in magnitude during times of high ambiguity relative 
to periods of low ambiguity.  
2.6.2. Baseline Regression 
To investigate the stock market reaction to firm-specific earnings announcements, we regress the 
cumulative abnormal return computed over a window surrounding the earnings release date, on 
the earnings surprise and controls.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                          (4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)  of firm 𝑖, computed over a window of 3 days, 5 
days, or 11 days around each earnings announcement date, while 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 refers to the standardized 
earnings surprise computed as described previously. The regression in (4) considers year and firm 
fixed effects, and controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the 
profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). The 
estimated results are reported in Table 2-8 and reveal a positive and significant response 
coefficient for the earnings surprise. This finding is expected and indicates that an increase 
(decrease) in the earnings surprise leads to an increase (decrease) in the cumulative abnormal 
return.   
 To understand whether the level of ambiguity alters the stock market reaction to firm-




𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 and a dummy variable, which identifies periods of high vs. low ambiguity. We estimate the 
following regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       (5) 
Where  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking values of 1 when the expected ambiguity is in its 
top 30th percentile across our sample period, and 0 otherwise. The regression in (5) considers year 
and firm fixed effects and controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). 
The estimated coefficient 𝛽3  captures the change in the stock market reaction to 𝑆𝑈𝐸 in times of 
high ambiguity relative to periods of low ambiguity. The estimated results are reported in Table 
2-9. In times of high ambiguity, the stock market reaction to earnings news seems to become 
weaker in general, as the estimated coefficient 𝛽3 is negative and significant for the regression 
having as dependent variable 𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1, +1] or 𝐶𝐴𝑅[−2, +2].   
2.6.3. Asymmetric Reaction to Good vs. Bad Earnings News 
To understand whether the stock market responds asymmetrically to good vs. bad earnings news 
in times of low vs. high ambiguity, we estimate the regressions in (6) and (7) and report the 
estimated results in Tables 2-10 and 2-11. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                 (6) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                  (7)  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return computed over a window of 3 days, 5 days, or 11 days 
around each earnings announcement date.  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠) takes the value of the earnings 




and firm fixed effects and control for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French 
(2016). 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 in (7) is a dummy variable which takes values of 1 when the expected 
ambiguity is in its top 30th percentile across our sample, and 0 otherwise.  
The estimated results in Tables 2-10 and 2-11 indicate that positive earnings news has a 
significant and positive impact on the cumulative abnormal return, while negative earnings news 
has a significant and negative impact on the cumulative abnormal return (as expected). Greater 
ambiguity weakens the stock market reaction to bad earnings news, as indicated by the negative 
and significant estimated coefficient 𝛽4 from regression (7). For good earnings news, we do not 
observe a significant difference in the stock market reaction to earnings surprises in times of high 
ambiguity relative to periods of low ambiguity. The weaker reaction of the stock market to earnings 
news in times of elevated ambiguity provides evidence in support of our fourth hypothesis. 
Tables 2-10 and 2-11 also include a test of asymmetry between the stock market response 
to good and bad earnings news. The results indicate a weaker reaction to bad relative to good 
earnings news in periods of elevated ambiguity. 
2.6.4. The Marginal Response to Earnings News- By Firm Characteristics 
Stocks of firms considered relatively ‘safe’ during times of high ambiguity, could react differently 
to earnings news compared to their counterparts. This is because during times of elevated 
systematic ambiguity, investors require different premiums for investing in safe relative to unsafe 
assets. In section 2.5, we find that ambiguity is priced in the cross-section of stock returns, and 
some categories of stocks tend to outperform their counterparts. In particular, we find that when 
ambiguity is expected to increase, stocks of firms with low information asymmetry and firms 




dividend payers, and firms with lower levels of earnings management, outperform relative to their 
counterparts.  
In this sub-section, we investigate how ambiguity affects the stock market reaction to 
earnings news for different categories of stocks.  We analyze stocks with high and low levels of the 
following firm-specific characteristics: number of analysts, standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts, firm size, firm age, volatility of returns, property, plant, and equipment over assets 
(𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-to-market ratio (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), 
and earnings management. A variable is considered to have low (high) values if it is below (above) 
its sample median. 
We perform a similar analysis as in relation (7) for each category, and report the results in 
Panels A to E of Table 2-12. The results indicate that in general, stocks which underperform relative 
to their counterparts in times of high ambiguity experience a weaker reaction to bad earnings news. 
These are stocks of firms that are small, riskier, unprofitable, non-dividend payers, followed by a 
small number of analysts, and with a high standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts.  
An interesting aspect of our results is that the stocks experiencing a weaker reaction to bad 
earnings news in times of high ambiguity, also tend to report more bad earnings news than good 
news in times of elevated ambiguity, as shown in Table 2-13. In other words, firms with high 
information asymmetry could potentially strategically decide to release ‘bad news’ during periods 
of elevated ambiguity, as the stock market reaction to the news can be diminished. However, this 
is just a conjecture and a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of our paper.  
2.6.5. The Magnitude of the Earnings Surprise and the Marginal Response to Earnings News  
For testing our fifth hypothesis, we regress the values of positive and negative earnings surprises 




that greater ambiguity is associated with earnings surprises of greater magnitude. That is, analysts 
seem to make less accurate forecasts during times of elevated ambiguity. This provides evidence 
in favor of our fifth hypothesis. According to Freeman and Tse (1992), surprises of greater 
magnitude have in general a smaller marginal response of the stock return to the news. We 
investigate whether our results are consistent with these findings. We estimate the regression in 
(8).      
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    (8) 
𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ , 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ , 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   are dummy variables taking values of 1 when the positive 
standardized earnings surprise is below the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th 
percentiles, and above the 70th percentile of positive earnings surprises in our sample. Otherwise, 
these dummy variables take values of 0. Similarly, 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− , 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− , 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   are 
dummy variables taking values of 1 when the negative standardized earnings surprise is below 
the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th percentiles, and above the 70th percentile of 
negative earnings surprises in our sample. Otherwise, these dummy variables take values of 0. 
The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the 
profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). Year 
and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The estimated results in Table 2-15 show 
that smaller magnitude surprises have a stronger marginal impact on the stock market reaction to 




Next, we investigate whether ambiguity still affects the stock market reaction to earnings 
news, after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise. To test this, we estimate the 
model in (8) with additional interaction terms between the dummies capturing the magnitude of 
positive and negative earnings surprises with the ambiguity dummy ( 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡). The estimated 
results reported in Table 2-16 show that ambiguity weakens the stock market reaction to bad 
earnings news, after controlling for the size of the surprise. In particular, this result is encountered 
for bad earnings news of medium and large magnitude.  
2.7. Robustness Analysis 
 
A potential concern is that our results are driven by factors other than ambiguity. To alleviate this 
concern, we test whether our results of a weaker stock market reaction to bad earnings news in 
times of high ambiguity relative to periods of low ambiguity remain robust when controlling for 
other potential influences. We control for the state of the business cycle, the real business 
conditions, the level of sentiment in the market, investor attention, the VIX, and the VIX 
components.  
To control for different states of the business cycle, we use the NBER peak and trough 
dates to distinguish between expansions and recessions. We re-estimate the regression in (7) with 
additional interaction terms between 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 and 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 with a dummy variable capturing 
the state of the business cycle. The results are reported in Table 2-16 and indicate that our results 
remain robust.  
To control for the changes in the real business conditions, we include in the analysis the 
daily values of the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business conditions index, introduced by 




economic indicators, such as initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial 
production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly 
real GDP. Greater than 0 values of the index reveal better-than-average economic conditions, while 
negative values indicate worse-than-average conditions. We estimate the model in (7) with 
additional interaction terms between 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 and 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 with the (lagged) ADS index. The 
results are reported in Table 2-16 as well, and are consistent with our previous findings.  
An additional potential concern is that the level of sentiment in the market could affect the 
stock market reaction to earnings news, rather than the level of ambiguity per se. In order to address 
this concern, we re-estimate the model in (7) by adding interaction terms between 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 and 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 with a sentiment variable. As alternative proxies for sentiment, we use the (lagged) 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment variable (raw and orthogonal measures). In addition, we also 
proxy sentiment as in Huang, Jiang, Tu, and Zhou (2015), including both their raw and orthogonal 
sentiment proxies. These results are reported in Table 2-17 and indicate that our results remain 
robust. In addition, our expected ambiguity variable is weakly correlated with the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) sentiment variable (correlation coefficient of -0.18) and with the Huang, Jiang, 
Tu, and Zhou (2015) sentiment measure (correlation coefficient of -0.21).14   
Since greater ambiguity periods can correspond to periods of greater investor attention, we 
need to ensure that our results still hold, while controlling for the level of attention in the stock 
market.15 To do so, we construct an aggregate measure of investor attention from Google Trends, 
by using the Google search volume (procedure similar to Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) of the 
term ‘S&P500’ from January 2004 until December 2017. The attention measure is weakly 
                                                          
14 These regressions are estimated over the sample period May 2000 (the date when our expected ambiguity variable 
becomes available) to December 2014 (the last date when the sentiment proxies used in the regression are available). 
15 Previous literature finds that limited investor attention can alter the stock market reaction to earnings news 




positively correlated with our expected ambiguity measure (correlation coefficient of 0.081). We 
re-estimate the equation in (7) by adding interaction terms between our 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 and 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 
variables, with the attention measure. The estimated results are reported in Table 2-18. The stock 
market reaction to bad earnings news is still weaker in times of elevated ambiguity, relative to 
periods of low ambiguity.   
Similar additional robustness checks, including tests for the influence of the VIX index, 
the influence of the VIX components (i.e. risk aversion and stock market uncertainty computed as 
in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013)) on the stock market’s reaction to earnings 
news are provided in Table 2-19. Our results remain robust after using these controls.  
Another potential concern could be that our results are driven by the greater investor 
disagreement during times of elevated ambiguity, rather than by the ambiguity measure itself. 
Unreported results show that the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts is not 
significantly different during times of low vs. high expected ambiguity. Thus, it is not likely that 
our results are driven by greater investor disagreement during times of elevated ambiguity.  
2.8. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether ambiguity has a significant effect on the cross-section of stock 
returns. We first construct a measure of ambiguity that is independent of risk, attitudes towards 
risk, and attitudes towards ambiguity based on the theoretical framework of expected utility with 
uncertain probabilities proposed by Izhakian (2017). We then show that ambiguity is priced in the 
cross-section of stocks and that investors require a premium when they are exposed to elevated 
ambiguity. This premium is in addition to the premium they require for bearing risk. By forming 
long-short portfolios based on various firm characteristics, we find that when ambiguity is 




to value/arbitrage, such as firms that are smaller, riskier, and less profitable, non-dividend payers, 
and firms with higher levels of earnings management, underperform their counterparts.  
Interestingly, our results indicate that ambiguity has an impact on the standard risk-return 
relation. That is, we find that during times of low ambiguity, the standard risk-return relation holds, 
namely riskier portfolios provide a higher return. However, when ambiguity is high, riskier 
portfolios provide lower returns, in violation of the standard positive risk-return relation. This 
finding reveals the need of extending modern portfolio theory, i.e. the mean-variance framework, 
to account for ambiguity as another dimension, in addition to the mean and standard deviation of 
returns (risk). In a portfolio optimization problem, an investor should minimize the aggregation of 
risk and ambiguity that he is exposed to (for a given level of expected return), rather than risk 
alone. It is possible that if risk and ambiguity simultaneously enter the portfolio optimization 
problem, the optimal portfolio might not be fully diversified. This is important for investors who 
are both risk-averse and ambiguity averse. We leave this investigation to be properly tested by 
future research.  
We also show that ambiguity reduces stock market efficiency by weakening the stock 
market reaction to firm-specific earnings announcements. The weaker reaction is more significant 
for stocks of firms that have greater information asymmetry, are small, old, unprofitable, and 
riskier. We thus contribute to research on the relation between asset prices and firm-specific 
fundamentals, by showing that ambiguity is an important determinant of the market response to 
news, in addition to other variables such as limited investor attention, investor sentiment, the state 
of the economy, and market implied volatility. This finding could have implications for the 
persistence of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) introduced by Ball and Brown (1968). 




Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics of Ambiguity and other Measures of Risk/Uncertainty 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the macro-level variables employed in the analysis. Ʊ2 denotes the level of 
ambiguity computed as described in section 2.3.1. in the text, while 𝜈 is the standard deviation of daily E-mini S&P 500 
futures returns. The table also reports the CBOE Volatility Index (the VIX index), and the VIX components: risk aversion 
(RA) and stock market uncertainty (UC) computed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). 
The sample period covered is from 10/10/1997 to 12/31/2017. 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
Ʊ2  5052  0.037  0.027  0.032  2.596  8.890  0.335  0.005 
𝜈  5052  0.083  0.078  0.034  0.613 -0.156  0.203  0.016 
𝑉𝐼𝑋  5052  20.490  18.855  8.583  1.902  6.258  80.860  9.140 
𝑅𝐴  5052  17.621  10.682  25.813  3.536  21.454  333.713 -117.921 






Table 2-2: The Correlation between Ambiguity, other measures of Market Uncertainty, and Systematic Risk Factors 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the macro-variables used in our analysis: ambiguity (Ʊ2), computed as described in section 2.3.1. in 
the text, the expected ambiguity ((Ʊ2)𝐸) computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text, the daily realized volatility (𝜈) of the E-mini S&P 500 futures, the 
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), the VIX components: risk aversion (RA) and stock market uncertainty (UC) computed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, 
Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). Other macro-variables considered are the Fama and French (2016) five factors: the excess market return (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), the size factor 
(SMB), the value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), the investment factor (CMA), and also the orthogonal version of HML (i.e. HMLO) computed as 
described in Fama and French (2016). The sample period covered is from 05/30/2000 to 12/31/2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively.       
 
     Ʊ𝟐 (Ʊ𝟐)𝑬 𝝂 VIX RA UC (𝑹𝒎 − 𝑹𝒇) SMB HML HMLO RMW 
(Ʊ𝟐)𝑬  0.968***           
𝝂 -0.024 -0.031**          
VIX -0.212*** -0.208***  0.680***         
RA -0.126*** -0.126***  0.629***  0.848***        
UC -0.021 -0.018  0.655***  0.780***  0.461***       
(𝑹𝒎 − 𝑹𝒇) -0.005 -0.004 -0.073*** -0.123*** -0.219***  0.000      
SMB -0.037** -0.040***  0.005 -0.034** -0.036** -0.024  0.148***     
HML -0.037** -0.038** -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.087*** -0.033**  0.117***  0.093***    
HMLO -0.012 -0.011 -0.040*** -0.049*** -0.084*** -0.032**  0.085***  0.004  0.872***   
RMW -0.021 -0.023  0.071***  0.089***  0.126***  0.026* -0.451*** -0.239***  0.000 -0.077***  




Table 2-3: Correlogram of 𝒍𝒏(Ʊ𝒕) 
This table reports the autocorrelations (𝐴𝐶) and the partial autocorrelation (𝑃𝐴𝐶) of ln(Ʊt) at different lags. 
       
       
Autocorrelation 
Partial 
Correlation Lag 𝐴𝐶   𝑃𝐴𝐶  𝑄 − 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 
       
               |*******         |******* 1 0.983 0.983 4885.0 0.000 
        |*******        *|      | 2 0.963 -0.088 9577.8 0.000 
        |*******         |      | 3 0.942 -0.063 14064. 0.000 
        |*******         |      | 4 0.919 -0.035 18337. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 5 0.897 0.019 22410. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 6 0.875 -0.031 26282. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 7 0.852 -0.016 29957. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 8 0.829 -0.025 33436. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 9 0.807 0.023 36732. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 10 0.785 -0.003 39856. 0.000 
        |******|         |      | 11 0.763 -0.025 42808. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 12 0.743 0.018 45602. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 13 0.724 0.047 48256. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 14 0.705 -0.013 50777. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 15 0.687 -0.001 53173. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 16 0.670 -0.006 55448. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 17 0.653 0.022 57614. 0.000 
        |***** |         |      | 18 0.637 -0.006 59675. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 19 0.622 -0.008 61635. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 20 0.606 -0.015 63498. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 21 0.589 -0.039 65258. 0.000 
        |****  |         |      | 22 0.573 0.012 66923. 0.000 
       








Table 2-4: Summary Statistics of Firm-Specific Characteristics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the main firm-specific variables employed in our analysis. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the firm size 
computed as the market value of equity (in millions of dollars), 𝐴𝑔𝑒 measures the number of years since the firm’s first 
appearance in CRSP, measured to the nearest month,  𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 refers to the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
previous 22 trading days, 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴 refers to property, plant, and equipment over assets, 𝑅𝐷/𝐴 captures the research and 
development expense over assets, while 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 refers to the absolute value of discretionary accruals, computed 
based on the modified Jones (1991) model. Panel A reports results for the full sample period, while Panel B reports the mean 
and the difference in means of these firm-specific characteristics during periods of high vs. low expected ambiguity. The 
periods of low (high) expected ambiguity correspond to those times when the expected ambiguity is in the bottom (top) three 
deciles across our sample period. The accounting and the financial variables are collected from Compustat and CRSP, 
respectively. The sample is from 05/30/2000 to 12/31/2017. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics-Full Sample 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴 𝑅𝐷/𝐴 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
Mean 1220.91 16.59 0.04 0.52  0.04  0.00 0.12 
Median 156.42 13.25 0.03 0.38  0.02  0.00 0.05 
Min 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.62 0.00 
Max 246672.63 91.67 4.08 16.40  63.50  1.96 90.78 
Std. Dev. 4905.41 12.91 0.04 0.51  0.34  0.03 0.55 
Skewness 12.38 1.91 18.45 5.33  116.21  41.75 59.10 
Kurtosis 262.91 5.48 1322.63 92.85  18572.17  2691.87 6903.91 
 
 
Panel B. Difference in Means between Periods of High and Low Ambiguity 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴 𝑅𝐷/𝐴 𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  1555.7000  0.0407  0.5319 0.0452 0.00174  0.1044 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  1076.4000  0.0447  0.5081 0.0419 0.00129  0.1198 






Table 2-5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main control variables used in our analysis across our entire sample 
period (Panel A), during periods of high (Panel B) and low expected ambiguity (Panel C). Panel D reports the 
difference in means of our control variables between times of high vs. low expected ambiguity. The periods of low 
(high) expected ambiguity correspond to those periods when the expected ambiguity is below (above) its sample 
median. The market excess return (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), and investment (CMA) 
factors are the five factors in Fama and French (2016), and are obtained from Kenneth French’s data library. The 
sample is from 05/30/2000 to 12/31/2017. 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝑀𝐴 
Mean  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01 
Median  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.00 
Min  0.00 -8.95 -3.41 -4.22 -3.03 -5.93 
Max  0.27  11.35  4.48  4.83  3.16  2.41 
Std. Dev.  0.03  1.21  0.57  0.66  0.50  0.42 
Skewness  2.35 -0.04  0.02  0.40  0.02 -0.84 
Kurtosis  6.73  8.04  3.07  8.77  4.73  15.88 
 
Panel B. High Ambiguity 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝑀𝐴 
Mean  0.06  0.01 -0.02 -0.01  0.01 -0.01 
Median   0.05  0.05 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
Min  0.03 -8.95 -3.41 -4.22 -2.60 -2.40 
Max  0.27  11.35  4.48  4.83  2.99  2.24 
Std. Dev.  0.04  1.30  0.59  0.67  0.42  0.36 
Skewness  1.99 -0.09  0.11  0.30  0.00  0.03 
Kurtosis  4.17  10.77  3.96  10.03  5.89  6.66 
 
Panel C. Low Ambiguity 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝑀𝐴 
Mean  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.03 
Median  0.02  0.08  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Min  0.00 -5.04 -3.16 -4.15 -3.03 -5.93 
Max  0.03  6.89  3.62  4.75  3.16  2.41 
Std. Dev.  0.01  1.11  0.55  0.65  0.56  0.47 
Skewness  0.03  0.06 -0.06  0.51  0.01 -1.25 
Kurtosis -1.12  2.16  1.94  7.36  3.65  17.57 
 
Panel D. Difference in Means between Periods of High vs. Low Ambiguity 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑅𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝑀𝐴 




Table 2-6: Time Series Regressions of Portfolio Returns 
This table reports results of the regression of the returns on long-short portfolio returns regressed on the expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸), the Fama and French 
(1992) three factors, and the Fama and French (2016) five factors respectively. The expected ambiguity, 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸  is computed as described in the text. The 
long-short portfolios are formed based on firm Size, Age, risk (𝜎), dividends (𝐷), profitability (𝐸), property, plant, and equipment over assets (𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research 
and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-to-market ratio (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). For each characteristic, 
we long firms in the top three NYSE deciles and short firms in the bottom three NYSE deciles. We report three sets of results for each firm characteristic. The first 
set of results include the estimated coefficients from the baseline regression 𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡=𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛿 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸 + 𝑢𝑡. The second set of results extends 
the baseline model to include the excess return on the market (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), the size factor (SMB), and the value factor (HML) from Fama and French (1992). The 
third set of results include the excess market return (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HMLO) computed as in Fama and French (2016), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). For each of the two extended models, we include an orthogonal 
ambiguity measure proxied by the residuals obtained from a regression of the expected ambiguity measure on the Fama and French (2016) five factors. SMB (HML) 
is not included as a control variable for the long-short portfolio returns formed on size (BE/ME). The sample is from 05/30/2000 to December 31, 2017. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Size, Age, and Risk 
  Intercept  𝑨𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕
𝑬 (𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒕 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒕 𝑹
𝟐(%) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 Large-Small  0.0015**  0.0011***      0.20 
Large-Small -0.0004***  0.0010***  0.0037***  -0.0031***   31.68 
Large-Small -0.0004***  0.0009***  0.0035***  -0.0026***  0.00114*** -0.0037*** 32.09 
𝑨𝒈𝒆 Old-Young -0.0019** -0.0010**      0.25 
Old-Young -0.0001 -0.0009** -0.0002 -0.0004*  0.0026***   5.54 
Old-Young -0.0002** -0.0006  0.0011***  0.0002  0.0016***  0.0046***  0.0039*** 15.31 
𝝈 High-Low -0.0022*** -0.0012***      0.18 
High-Low -0.0003** -0.0008**  0.0032***  0.0040*** -0.0014***   24.10 







Panel B. Profitability and Dividend Policy 
  Intercept  𝑨𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕
𝑬 (𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒕 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒕 𝑹
𝟐(%) 
𝑬 > 0− < 0  0.0075**  0.0044**      0.49 
> 0− < 0 -0.0001  0.0043** -0.0011* -0.0043***  0.0030**   2.40 
> 0− < 0 -0.0002  0.0044** -0.0005 -0.0037**  0.0034**  0.0024  0.0023 2.48 
𝑫 > 0− = 0 -0.0002 -0.0001      0.58 
> 0− = 0 -0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 -0.0018***  0.0034***   16.77 
> 0− = 0 -0.0003***  0.0004*  0.0015*** -0.0009***  0.0027***  0.0056***  0.0035*** 35.47 
 
Panel C. Tangibility and Growth Opportunities 
  Intercept  𝑨𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕
𝑬 (𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒕 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒕 𝑹
𝟐(%) 
𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨 High-Low -0.0032*** -0.0016***      0.38 
High-Low -0.0004*** -0.0013***  0.0005** -0.0001   0.0041***   9.47 
High-Low -0.0006*** -0.0010**  0.0020***  0.0010***  0.0036***  0.0063***  0.0033*** 17.78 
𝑹𝑫/𝑨 High-Low  0.0023***  0.0011***      0.25 
High-Low  0.0003***  0.0009**  0.0009***  0.0019*** -0.0050***   18.83 
High-Low  0.0005***  0.0006* -0.0009***  0.0005** -0.0047*** -0.0076*** -0.0033*** 34.71 
𝑩𝑬/𝑴𝑬 High-Low  0.0048  0.0031*      0.17 
High-Low -0.0006  0.0029 -0.0022* -0.0008    0.99 
High-Low -0.0007  0.0034* -0.0019* -0.0008   0.0012  0.0069*** 1.64 
 
Panel D. Discretionary Accruals 
  Intercept  𝑨𝒎𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕
𝑬 (𝑹𝑴,𝒕 − 𝑹𝑭,𝒕) 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕 𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕 𝑹𝑴𝑾𝒕 𝑪𝑴𝑨𝒕 𝑹
𝟐(%) 
𝑫𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 High-Low -0.0015** -0.0008**      0.17 
High-Low -0.0002 -0.0008**  0.0003***  0.0009*** -0.0011***   2.00 





Table 2-7: Statistics of Earnings Surprises and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Panels A and B report the mean of negative (Panel A) and positive (Panel B) standardized earnings surprises, computed 
as the difference between each firm’s reported earnings per share (EPS) minus the latest analyst consensus EPS 
forecast before the earnings announcement date, scaled by the stock price two days before the earnings announcement 
date. Periods of low (high) ambiguity correspond to periods when the expected ambiguity is in the bottom (top) 30th 
percentile across our sample period. This table also reports the average cumulative abnormal return for different 
windows around the release date. The last column in each Panel reports the difference in means for each variable 
during periods of high relative to periods of low expected ambiguity. All values are in %. The sample period is from 
May 2000 to December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.       
Panel A. Negative Earnings Surprise 
  High Ambiguity Low Ambiguity Difference (High-Low) 
Size of Surprise -3.28 -2.85 -0.43*** 
CAR [-1, +1] -1.54 -2.07  0.53*** 
CAR [-2, +2] -1.81 -2.29  0.49** 
CAR [-5, +5] -2.41 -2.62  0.22 
CAR [ 0, +10] -1.98 -2.77  0.79*** 
 
Panel B. Positive Earnings Surprise 
  High Ambiguity Low Ambiguity Difference (High-Low) 
Size of Surprise 1.51 1.52  -0.01 
CAR [-1, +1] 1.52 1.46   0.06 
CAR [-2, +2] 1.37 1.31   0.06 
CAR [-5, +5] 0.98 0.75   0.22 






Table 2-8: The Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News – Baseline Regression 
The table reports the estimates for the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return computed over a window of 3 days, 5 days, or 11 days around each earnings 
announcement date, while 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  refers to the earnings standardized surprise. The regression controls for the size 
factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) 
from Fama and French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regressions. The sample period covered 
is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟏, +𝟏] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟐, +𝟐] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟓, +𝟓] 
𝑆𝑈𝐸  0.1689***  0.1772***  0.2037*** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0080***  0.0085***  0.0080*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0015 -0.0019* -0.0035*** 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0037*** -0.0046*** -0.0050*** 






Table 2-9: The Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News in times of High Ambiguity 
The table reports the estimates for the following model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return computed over the windows [-1,+1], [-2,+2], and [-5,+5], around 
each earnings announcement date. 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the standardized earnings surprise and  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variable 
taking values of 1 when the expected ambiguity is in the top 30th percentile across our sample, and 0 otherwise. The 
regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), 
and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). The sample period is from May 2000 to December 
2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟏, +𝟏] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟐, +𝟐] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟓, +𝟓] 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  0.1889***  0.1919***  0.2176*** 
 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡  0.0018  0.0010 -0.0019 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -0.0844*** -0.0625* -0.0633 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0080***  0.0085***  0.0080*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0013 -0.0018* -0.0035*** 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0038*** -0.0046*** -0.0049*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0044*** -0.0019 -0.0042** 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  Yes  Yes  Yes 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Overall Impact of SUE:    





Table 2-10: The Stock Market Reaction to Good vs. Bad Earnings News- Baseline Regression 
The table reports the estimates for the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days, 5 days, or 
11 days around each earnings announcement date.  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings 
standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise. 
The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), 
and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the 
regressions. This table also reports a test of asymmetry that examines whether the response of stocks to good and bad 
earnings surprises is asymmetric. The sample period covered is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟏, +𝟏] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟐, +𝟐] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟓, +𝟓] 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2451***  0.2666***  0.3277*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1059***   0.1034***  0.1014*** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0079***  0.0084***  0.0079*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0015 -0.0019* -0.0035*** 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0038*** -0.0047*** -0.0051*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0045*** -0.0020 -0.0041** 
Test of Asymmetry    







Table 2-11: The Stock Market Reaction to Good vs. Bad Earnings News in times of High 
Ambiguity 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days, 5 days, or 11 days around each 
earnings announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, 
taking values of the earnings surprise if the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable taking values of 1 when the expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 
2.3.2. in the text) is in the top 30th percentile across our sample period, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for 
the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor 
(CMA) from Fama and French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regressions. We also provide 
a test of asymmetry that examines whether the response of stocks to good and bad earnings surprises is asymmetric. 
The sample period covered is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟏, +𝟏] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟐, +𝟐] 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟓, +𝟓] 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2523***  0.2646***  0.3232*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1334***  0.1285***  0.1255*** 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0012  0.0000 -0.0032 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0422  0.0057  0.0208 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1022** -0.0974* -0.1033 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0079***  0.0085***  0.0079*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0013 -0.0018* -0.0035*** 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0039*** -0.0047*** -0.0051*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0044*** -0.0019 -0.0042** 
    
Test of Asymmetry    
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.2102***  0.2703***  0.3440*** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.0312  0.0311  0.0223 






Table 2-12: The Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News in times of High Ambiguity: Firm-Specific Characteristics 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days around each earnings 
announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if the surprise is 
positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variables taking values of 1 when the expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as 
described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is in its top 30th percentile, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor 
(HML), the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regressions. 
We also provide a test of asymmetry that examines whether the response of stocks to good and bad earnings surprises is asymmetric. The firm-specific 
characteristics considered are: the number of analysts making recommendations for each stock, the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the firm 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝑎𝑔𝑒, total risk (𝜎), property, plant, and equipment over assets (𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-to-market ratio 
(𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). We also consider two categorial variables: E to capture whether the firm is profitable 
(E > 0) or unprofitable (E<0), and D to capture whether the firm pays dividends (D>0) or not (D=0). A firm characteristic has low (high) values if it is below 
(above) its sample median. The sample period covered is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Information Asymmetry 
 𝑵𝒓. 𝑨𝒏𝒂𝒍𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒔 𝑺𝒕𝒅𝑫𝒆𝒗. 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒔 
 Low High Low High 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2277***  0.2949***  0.8811***  0.1848*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1625***  0.0904**  0.0690  0.1981*** 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0002  0.0018  0.0016 -0.0004 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0547 -0.0638 -0.0670 -0.0473 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1185* -0.0802 -0.2415 -0.1393** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0069***  0.0086***  0.0081***  0.0084*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0037** -0.0005 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0041*** -0.0039*** -0.0027 -0.0050*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0038** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0059*** 
Test of Asymmetry     
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.1729**  0.2311***  0.8141***  0.1375** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.0440  0.010 -0.1724  0.0587 




Panel B. Size, Age, and Risk 
 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑨𝒈𝒆 𝝈 
 Small Big Young Old Low High 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠   0.2084***  0.3291***  0.2139***  0.3139***  0.4016***  0.2290*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠   0.2144***  0.0207  0.1129***  0.1464***  0.0268  0.2453*** 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦   0.0010  0.0011  0.0004  0.0014  0.0024 -0.0009 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1015  0.0041 -0.0059 -0.1017 -0.0582 -0.0223 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1077* -0.0666 -0.1116 -0.0994* -0.0121 -0.2003** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵   0.0086***  0.0065***  0.0071***  0.0083***  0.0063***  0.0090*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿   0.0009 -0.0021* -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0013 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0049*** -0.0030** -0.0068*** -0.0012  0.0004 -0.0072*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0014 -0.0056*** -0.0048*** -0.0035** -0.0024 -0.0041** 
Test of Asymmetry       
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)   0.1070*  0.3332***  0.2079***  0.2122***  0.3435***  0.2067** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)   0.1068* -0.0459  0.0013  0.0470  0.0147  0.0449 






Panel C. Profitability and Dividend Policy 
 𝑬 𝑫 
 𝐸 < 0 𝐸 > 0 𝐷 = 0 𝐷 > 0 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2477***  11.3124***  0.2193***  0.7442*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1361*** -0.3879  0.1622***  0.0438 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0008  0.0042  0.0013 -0.0004 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0602 -7.7425** -0.0257 -0.3320** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1205***  0.1823 -0.1134** -0.1311** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0077***  0.0146  0.0082***  0.0063*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0013  0.0081 -0.0015 -0.0002 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0039*** -0.0370 -0.0058***  0.0023 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0042*** -0.0415 -0.0045*** -0.0035* 
Test of Asymmetry     
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.1875***  3.5699**  0.1936***  0.4121*** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.0156 -0.2057  0.0489 -0.0874 






Panel D. Tangibility and Growth Opportunities 
 𝑷𝑷𝑬/𝑨 𝑹𝑫/𝑨 𝑩𝑬/𝑴𝑬 
 Low High Low High Low High 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.3396***  0.2918***  0.3936***  0.1652*** -0.0333  0.1680 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.0124  0.1422***  0.2208***  0.1004 -0.2882*  0.1086 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0052  0.0052**  0.0010  0.0006 -0.0026  0.0076* 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0217  0.0153 -0.1312 -0.0146  0.3841*  0.2243 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.2081* -0.0349 -0.1675* -0.1977  0.2641  0.0225 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0092***  0.0058***  0.0103***  0.0061***  0.0174***  0.0095** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0048** -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0036* -0.0039  0.0115* 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0086***  0.0000 -0.0039** -0.0088*** -0.0001 -0.0048 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0044*  0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0085*** -0.0119 -0.0092 
Test of Asymmetry       
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.3179***  0.3071***  0.2623*  0.1506**  0.3509*  0.3923** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.2205**  0.1073  0.0533 -0.0973 -0.0241  0.1312 







Panel E. Discretionary Accruals 
 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
 Low High 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1899**  0.3102*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1256**  0.0398 
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0015  0.0120** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  0.0636  0.0781 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0842  0.0712 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0063***  0.0061* 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0037 -0.0041 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0084*** -0.0064* 
𝐶𝑀𝐴  0.0034 -0.0022 
Test of Asymmetry   
GoodNews+(GoodNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.2535  0.3883** 
BadNews+(BadNews*𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)  0.0414  0.1110 








Table 2-13: Frequency of Good and Bad Earnings News in times of High vs. Low Expected 
Ambiguity 
This table reports the proportion of good and bad earnings surprises for different categories of stocks, in times of low vs. 
high expected ambiguity. A firm-specific characteristic is considered to have high (low) values if it is above (below) the 
sample median during quarter t. We consider the following firm characteristics: the number of analysts making 
recommendations for each stock, the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the firm 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝑎𝑔𝑒, total risk (𝜎), 
property, plant, and equipment over assets (𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-to-market 
ratio (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). Periods of low (high) expected ambiguity are 
considered those periods when the expected ambiguity is above (below) its sample median. The sample period covered is 
from May 2000 until December 2017. 

















𝑁𝑟. 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 Low 46.75% 8.30% 44.95% 51.44% 6.83% 41.72% 
High 38.18% 10.97% 50.85% 43.51% 9.27% 47.22% 
        
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 Low 33.22% 15.31% 51.47% 35.98% 14.81% 49.22% 
High 46.23% 5.75% 48.02% 51.08% 4.91% 44.02% 
        
Size Small 45.38% 9.37% 45.25% 49.04% 8.16% 42.80% 
Big 38.76% 10.08% 51.16% 44.83% 8.35% 46.82% 
        
Age Young 40.29% 9.75% 49.96% 45.61% 8.04% 46.34% 
Old 44.13% 9.68% 46.19% 48.02% 8.49% 43.49% 
        
𝜎 Low 45.21% 9.57% 45.23% 48.93% 7.78% 43.29% 
High 39.81% 9.82% 50.37% 43.89% 8.92% 47.19% 
        
𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴 Low 35.96% 11.55% 52.49% 39.04% 10.25% 50.71% 
High 45.64% 8.65% 45.71% 49.80% 7.61% 42.59% 
        
𝑅𝐷/𝐴 Low 41.38% 10.79% 47.82% 46.46% 8.80% 44.74% 
High 33.57% 10.04% 56.39% 37.30% 9.01% 53.69% 
        
𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸 Low 43.01% 6.78% 50.21% 43.41% 7.25% 49.34% 
High 55.29% 4.12% 40.59% 53.60% 5.68% 40.73% 
        
𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 Low 42.32% 9.38% 48.30% 47.07% 8.24% 44.70% 
High 34.70% 12.31% 53.00% 37.38% 11.31% 51.31% 






Table 2-14: The Magnitude of Earnings Surprises in times of High Expected Ambiguity 
This table reports the estimated coefficients obtained when regressing positive and negative standardized unexpected 
earnings surprises (𝑆𝑈𝐸) on our expected ambiguity measure. 𝑆𝑈𝐸 is computed as the difference between each firm’s 
reported earnings per share (EPS) minus the latest analyst consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement 
date, scaled by the stock price two days before the earnings announcement date (as in Fang, Huang, and Karpoff 
(2016)). The expected ambiguity used in these regressions is 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 
2.3.2. in the text. Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regressions. The sample period covered is from May 
2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Positive Surprise Negative Surprise 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡







Table 2-15: The Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News  
(Controlling for the Magnitude of the Earnings Surprise) 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− +
𝛽6𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
computed over a window [−1, +1] around each earnings announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to 
positive (negative) standardized earnings surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if the surprise is positive 
(negative), and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ , 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ , 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   are dummy variables taking values of 1 when the 
positive standardized earnings surprise is below the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th percentiles, and 
above the 70th percentile of positive earnings surprises in our sample. Otherwise, these dummy variables take values 
of 0. Similarly, 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− , 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− , 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   are dummy variables taking values of 1 when the negative 
standardized earnings surprise is below the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th percentiles, and above the 
70th percentile of negative earnings surprises in our sample. Otherwise, these dummy variables take values of 0. The 
regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), 
and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the 
regression. The sample period covered is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑷 − 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+  -3.3751 0.1802 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   8.7886*** <.0001 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   0.2295*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   12.7088*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   0.6917*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   0.0660*** 0.0047 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0072*** <.0001 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0017* 0.0841 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0036*** 0.0004 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0051*** <.0001 
   
Test of Difference    
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ − 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   3.6046 0.1517 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− − 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡






Table 2-16: The Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News in times of High Ambiguity 
(Controlling for the Magnitude of the Earnings Surprise) 
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝜆2𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝜆3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− +
𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− + ϒ1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + ϒ2𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + ϒ3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝜗1𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 +
𝜗2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝜗3𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window [−1, +1] around each earnings 
announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) standardized earnings surprises, taking 
values of the earnings surprise if the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ,
𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ , 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   are dummy variables taking values of 1 when the positive standardized earnings surprise is 
below the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th percentiles, and above the 70th percentile of positive earnings 
surprises in our sample. Otherwise, these dummy variables take values of 0. Similarly, 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ,
𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− , 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   are dummy variables taking values of 1 when the negative standardized earnings surprise is 
below the 30th percentile, between the 30th and the 70th percentiles, and above the 70th percentile of negative earnings 
surprises in our sample. Otherwise, these dummy variables take values of 0.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking 
values of 1 when the expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is 
in the top 30th percentile across our sample period, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), 
the orthogonal value factor (HML), the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and 
French (2016). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. The sample period covered is from May 
2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 𝑪𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑷 − 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   2.5121 0.3178 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   10.4553*** <.0001 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+   0.2583*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   11.2216*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   0.5332*** <.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
−   0.0516** 0.0341 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡  5.7196 0.2640 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -1.4691 0.1378 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
+ ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -0.0273 0.5806 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -0.5811 0.7440 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -0.3186* 0.0515 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑈𝐸,𝑡
− ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 -0.1043** 0.0109 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0079*** <.0001 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0013 0.1623 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0037*** 0.0001 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0042*** 0.0001 
   






Table 2-17: Ambiguity Effect on the Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News  
(Controlling for the Business Cycle)  
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋 ∗ 𝑋𝑡 +
𝑏𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 +
𝑑𝑋
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡 + 𝑑𝑋
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days around each earnings announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  
(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if 
the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variables taking values of 1 when the 
expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is in its top 30
th 
percentile, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). In Panel A, 𝑋𝑡 is 
dummy variable taking values of 1 during expansionary periods, and 0 during recessions. The expansion vs. recession 
periods are identified by using the NBER peak and trough dates. In Panel B, 𝑋𝑡  is a control variable that accounts for 
the (lagged) Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index. Year and firm fixed effects are included in the 
regressions. The sample period covered is from May 2000 until December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑷𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒍 𝑨  𝑷𝒂𝒏𝒆𝒍 𝑩 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2265***   0.2624*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1438***   0.1097*** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0477  -0.0445 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0994**  -0.1099** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋  0.0290   0.0343 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋 -0.0179  -0.0490** 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0077***   0.0078*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0012  -0.0013 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0039***  -0.0039*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0040***  -0.0041*** 






Table 2-18: Ambiguity Effect on the Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News  
(Controlling for Sentiment)  
 The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝑏𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 +
𝑑𝑋
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑋
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days around each earnings announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  
(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if 
the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variables taking values of 1 when the 
expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is in its top 30
th 
percentile, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). 𝑋𝑡−1 is a control 
variable that accounts for sentiment. Sentiment is proxied by the Baker and Wurgler (2006) raw (BW) and orthogonal 
sentiment index (𝐵𝑊⊥), and by the raw (HJTZ) and orthogonal (HJTZ⊥)sentiment measure in Huang, Jiang, Tu, and 
Zhou (2015). Year and firm fixed effects are included in the regressions. The sample period covered is from May 
2000 until December 2014. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 𝑩𝑾 𝑩𝑾⊥ 𝐇𝐉𝐓𝐙 𝐇𝐉𝐓𝐙
⊥ 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2636***  0.2595***  0.2563***  0.2562*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.1393***  0.1389***  0.1356***  0.1345*** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0915* -0.0887 -0.0868 -0.0849 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1183** -0.1172** -0.1075** -0.1080** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋 -0.0215 -0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0001 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋 -0.0255 -0.0271  0.0059  0.0055 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0075***  0.0075***  0.0075***  0.0075*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0037*** -0.0037*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** 





Table 2-19: Ambiguity Effect on the Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News  
(Controlling for Investor Attention)  
The table reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝑏𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 +
𝑑𝑋
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑋
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days around each earnings announcement. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  
(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings surprise if 
the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variables taking values of 1 when the 
expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is in its top 30
th 
percentile, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). 𝑋𝑡  is a control 
variable that accounts for investor attention. The attention measure if obtained from Google Trends and represents 
the monthly Google search volume for the term ‘S&P500’ over the period January 2004 to December 2017. The 
regression includes year and firm fixed effects, and is estimated over the period January 2004 to December 2017. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.6110*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.0782 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0698 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0827* 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋 -0.0088*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑋  0.0011 









 Table 2-20: Ambiguity Effect on the Stock Market Reaction to Earnings News  
(Controlling for VIX and VIX Components)  
Panel A reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑉𝐼𝑋 ∗ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝑏𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 +
𝑑𝑉𝐼𝑋
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑉𝐼𝑋
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, where  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) computed over a window of 3 days around each earnings announcement. 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡) refers to positive (negative) earnings standardized surprises, taking values of the earnings 
surprise if the surprise is positive (negative), and 0 otherwise.  𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 is a dummy variables taking values of 1 
when the expected ambiguity (𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐸= ln Ʊ?̂?  computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text) is in its top 
30th percentile, and 0 otherwise. The regression controls for the size factor (SMB), the orthogonal value factor (HML), 
the profitability factor (RMW), and the investment factor (CMA) from Fama and French (2016). 𝑋𝑡  is a control 
variable that accounts for the level of VIX index. Panel B reports the estimates of the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 +
𝑏𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐴𝑚𝑏
𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑈𝐶
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +
𝑑𝑈𝐶
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑅𝐴
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑅𝐴
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +
𝑢𝑖𝑡, where most of the variables were previously introduced. 𝑅𝐴𝑡  and 𝑈𝐶𝑡 represent the components of VIX, namely 
risk aversion and the stock market uncertainty, computed as described in section 2.1. in Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo 
Duca (2013).  All regressions include year and firm fixed effects and are estimated over the period May 2000 to 
December 2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠  0.2749***  0.2646*** 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 -0.0002  0.0685** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0413 -0.0449 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1111** -0.1250*** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 -0.0011 - 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1  0.0058*** - 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -  0.0002 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 -  0.0016** 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 - -0.0010 
𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 -  0.0009 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.0075***  0.0075*** 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.0019** -0.0018** 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 -0.0035*** -0.0034*** 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 -0.0044*** -0.0043*** 







Figure 2-1. Ambiguity and other Measures of Risk/Uncertainty 
 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of our ambiguity measure computed as described in section 3.1. in the text, together with the evolution of the daily realized 
volatility of the E-mini S&P 500 futures, the VIX Index, and the Variance Risk Premium. The sample period covered is from 10/10/1997 to 12/31/2017.    
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of our ambiguity measure computed as described in section 2.3.1. in the text, together with the evolution of the daily realized 
volatility of the E-mini S&P 500 futures, the VIX Index, and the Variance Risk Premium. The sample period covered is from 10/10/1997 to 12/31/2017.   
    




Figure 2-2. Expected Ambiguity 
This figure summarizes the expected ambiguity computed as described in section 2.3.2. in the text. The first 







Figure 2-3. Two-Way Sorted Average Stock Returns 
This figure contains two-way sorted average stock returns by firm characteristics and by our expected ambiguity measure. At the end of each quarter we form 3 
portfolios according to the NYSE breakpoints on firm 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒, total risk (𝜎), dividends (𝐷), profitability (𝐸), property, plant, and equipment over assets 
(𝑃𝑃𝐸/𝐴), research and development expense over assets (𝑅𝐷/𝐴), book-to-market ratio (𝐵𝐸/𝑀𝐸), and discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠). As breakpoints for our 
portfolios, we use the 30th and the 70th percentiles of each firm characteristic. We form long-short equally-weighted portfolios by taking a long position in stocks 
with a high level of firm-specific characteristics, and short positions in those with low levels of firm-specific characteristics. We rebalance the portfolios every 
quarter. The grey bars denote the average return of long-short portfolios formed by firm-specific characteristics, for periods of low ambiguity, i.e. when the expected 
ambiguity is in the lowest three deciles across our sample period. Blue bars denote the average return of long-short portfolios during periods of high ambiguity, i.e. 
when the expected ambiguity is in the highest three deciles across our sample period. Black bars denote the average return for moderate ambiguity, ambiguity is 
between the lowest three deciles and the highest three deciles across our sample period. The sample period covered is from June 2000 until December 2017. 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆 𝑨𝒈𝒆 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 (𝝈) 









Figure 2-3- Contd. 
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Figure 2-4. Average Abnormal Returns during Periods of Low vs. High Expected Ambiguity  
This figure reports the average abnormal stock returns around firm-specific earnings announcements, computed for 
firms with positive (Panel A) and negative (Panel B) earnings surprises. The earnings surprise is calculated as the 
firm’s actual earnings per share (EPS) minus the latest analyst consensus EPS forecast before the earnings 
announcement date (both from I/B/E/S), scaled by the firm’s stock price two days before the earnings announcement 
date (similar to Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016)). Abnormal returns are computed as described in section 2.6 in the 
text. Panels A and B compare the average cumulative returns for periods of low and high expected ambiguity. The 
expected ambiguity is high (low) when it is in the top (bottom) three deciles across our same period. The sample 
period covered is May 2000 to December 2017. 
Panel A. Positive Earnings Surprises  
  
Panel B. Negative Earnings Surprises  




Figure 2-5. PEAD during Periods of Low vs. High Expected Ambiguity 
This figure reports the average cumulative abnormal return over the period of 60 days after positive (Panel A) and 
negative (Panel B) firm-specific earnings surprises. The earnings surprise is calculated as the firm’s actual earnings 
per share (EPS) minus the latest analyst consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date (both from 
I/B/E/S), scaled by the firm’s stock price two days before the earnings announcement date (similar to Fang, Huang, 
and Karpoff (2016)). Abnormal returns are computed as described in section 2.6 in the text. Panels A and B compare 
the average cumulative returns for periods of low and high expected ambiguity. The expected ambiguity is high (low) 
when it is in the top (bottom) three deciles across our same period. The sample period covered is from May 2000 to 
December 2017. 
Panel A. Positive Earnings Surprises  
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